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LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS - LEGISLATURe'S POWER
TO MAKE THE FACT THAT A DEFENDANT WAS ARMED WITH PISTOL, WHICH HE'
HAD NO LICENSE TO CARRY, PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF INTENT TO COMMIT CRIME
UPHELD. - Harold Thomas was charged with murder in the second degree and
assault in the first degree. At the trial evidence was admitted, over objection, that
Thomas was carrying a pistol at the time of the commission of the crimes for which
he had no license. The court instructed the jury that the fact that the defendant
was armed with a pistol which he had no license to carry was prima facie evidence
of his intention to commit the offenses charged.1 The defendant was convicted on
both counts and he appealed on the ground that the instruction of the court con-
cerning the carrying of an unlicensed pistol was based on an unconstitutional
statute. Held: there is a rational connection between carrying pistols without a li-
cense and intending crimes of violence, and the statute in question was constitu-
tional. State v. Thomas, 364 P.2d 930 (Wash. 1961).
The power of the legislature to enact statutes embodying presumptions or pro-
viding that proof of one fact shall be prima facie evidence of another has been
widely recognized.2 But the courts are aware that a more or less mechanistic method
of invoking statutory presumptions can be a danger to the liberty of the individual.
For this reason a number of tests have been developed by the judiciary to aid it
in deciding whether a legislature has stayed within constitutional limits. One of
these is the widely-accepted "rational connection" approach which was formulated
by the Supreme Court in Mobile, 1. & R.C.R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed,3 wherein it was
stated:
That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another
may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal
protection of the law it is only essential that there shall be some rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and
that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so un-
reasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.4
The wisdom of the legislature is accorded a wide range of discretion by this
test. Since the inference of one fact from another is based on the observation of
their relationship in human experience, it is thought that the legislature is better
able to make this judgment than are the courts.5
As more cases involving statutory changes of evidentiary rules reached the
Supreme Court, an expansion of the "rational connection" test took place. The argu-
ment has been raised that, in spite of the absence of a rational connection, the
statutory presumption might be upheld on the basis of a "manifest disparity in
convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge." 6 However, in Tot v. United
States,7 the Supreme Court said:
The Government seems to argue that there are two alternative tests of
the validity of a prestimption created by statute. The first is that there be
a rational connection between the facts proved and the fact presumed; the
second that of comparative convenience of producing evidence of the ulti-
mate fact. We are of opinion that these are not independent tests but that
the first is controlling and the second but a corollary. Under our decisions,
a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connec-
1 This was drawn from WASH. R-v. CODE § 9.41.030 (1956), providing: "In the trial of
a person for committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence, the fact that he was
armed with a pistol and had no license to carry the same shall be prima facie evidence of his
intention to commit said crime of violence."
2 Mobile, J. & R.C.R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910); People v. Cannon, 139
N.Y. 32, 34 N.E. 759 (1893).
3 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
4 Id. at 43. (Emphasis supplied.)
5 56 HARv. L. Rlv. 1324, 1325 (1943).
6 Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
7 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
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tion between the fact- proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference
of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection
between the two in coinmon experience.$
It seems clear, then, from what the Supreme Court has stated, that the true test
which a legislative presumption must undergo is the "rational connection" formula.
Even before the decisions just discussed were handed down, the'Court of Ap-
peals of New York had expressed -its views on the matter in People v. Cannon.9
After acknowledging the general power of the legislature to enact that, even in
criminal prosecutions, when certain facts have been proved they shall be prima
facie evidence of the existence of the main fact in question, the court said:
The limitations are that the fact upon which the presumption is to rest
must have some fair relation to, or natural connection with, the main fact.
* A provision of this kind does not take away or impair the right of trial
by jury. It does not in reality change the burden of proof. The people must
at all times sustain the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
a .reasonable doubt.10
It should be carefully noted that the effect of the presumption on the jury's de-
termination is permissive and not mandatory.
Only one jurisdiction, Indiana, dissents from the views of the decisions just
reviewed. In Powers v. State," which involved a statute very similar to the one in
question in State v. Thomas 2 the court said:
Facts which are universally recognized as indicating guilt . . . are prima
facie evidence of guilt without any legislative enactment, and, if the Legis-
lature is confined to designating such facts as prima facie evidence and the
designation of facts which might be consistent with innocence- is beyond
their power, enactments on the subject are of no force or effect in either
event.' 3
In addition, the reasoning of the Cannon4 case, as to the effect of the legislative
presumption on the jury's freedom of determination, is completely rejected in the
Powers decision.' 5 In view of that language and the statements in Dedrick v. State ' 6
it is doubtful that Indiana recognizes the power of the legislature to act in this area
in spite of the declarations of other courts that the power always exists, subject to
limitations of reasonableness and fairness.' 7 The Powers decision, which is referred
to by the court in the Thomas case, indicated that the Indiana courts would dis-
agree that the statute under consideration in Thomas is valid under the "rational
connection" test.' However that may be, the real difference between the WaSh-
ington and Indiana courts appears to reside in the general approach which these
courts take in this matter. The court in Powers went further than applying the
"rational connection" test and required that the proven fact from which the prima
facie evidence of criminal intent is inferred be sufficient of itself to sustain a con-
viction without legislative support.' 9 It is submitted that this attitude renders
legislative acts in this area wholly ineffective.
The decisions of the Supreme Court of Washington have been consistent with
the approach of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the New
York court reviewed above. In State v. Fitzpatrick,20 involving a statute which
declared that the possession of burglary tools is prima facie evidence of an intent
8 Id. at 467-68.
9 139 N.Y. 32, 34 N.E. 759 (1893).
10 Id. at 762.
11 Powers v. State, 204 Ind. 472, 184 N.E. 549 (1933).
12 State v. Thomas, 364 P.2d 930 (Wash. 1961).
13 Powers v. State, supra note 11, at'552.
14 People v. Cannon, 139 N.Y. 32, 34 N.E. 759 (1893).
15 Powers v. State, supra note 11, at 5.53.
16 "Under our Constitution neither the Legislature by enactment nor the court by instruc-
tion may determine what is prima facie evidence of an ultimate fact." 210 Ind. 259, 2 N.E.2d
409, 418 (1936).
17 Tot v. United States, supra note 7; People v. 'Cannon, supra note 14.
18 Powers v. State, 204 Ind. 472,.184 N.E. 549, 552 (1933).
19 Id. at 552-553.
20 141 Wash. 638, 251 Pac. 875 (1927).
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to use them, the court deemed itself unable to say that there was "no rational con-
nection between the possession of false keys and picklocks and the presumed intent
to use them in the commission of a crime." 21 In taking that position, the court
cited as authority the cases of Yee Hem v. United States22 and Mobile J. & R.C.R.R.
Co., v. Turnipseed.23
The most extensive analysis of Washington's position as to the effect of statu-
tory presumptions in criminal proceedings is contained in State v. Rouw.2 4 There
the court had before it a statute which declared that the illegal possession of liquor,
with certain exceptions for the clergy, constituted prima facie evidence that the
liquor was held for the purpose of unlawful sale or disposition. The court approved
the instruction given by the trial judge which embodied the substance of the statute
just paraphrased. In construing the effect of the prima facie case on the burden
of proof, the court said:
Assume that the prosecution introduces evidence from which the jury
may find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had in his possession
intoxicating liquor....
Assuming next that the accused introduces no evidence whatever, there
still remains a question of fact to be determined by the jury. * * * The pre-
sumption of innocence is still operating, and the jury must consider the
admitted or proven facts establishing possession, the presumption which
under the law follows therefrom, and the presumption that the accused is
innocent. 25
These statements make it adequately clear that statutory presumptions in criminal
trials in the Washington courts are not intended, either directly or indirectly, to re-
duce the substantial rights of its citizens who are accused of crimes which involve
legislative rules of evidence. In fact, it is to be wondered whether they have any
effect other than procedural.
A very recent pronouncement of the Washington court, State v. Person,2
6
largely reiterated what the court said in Rouw, again negativing the charge
leveled by some that statutory presumptions shift the burden of proof or compel
the accused to give evidence against himself.
The court in State v. Thomas" traveled along a well-used path to its decision.
At the outset, it recognized the power of the state legislature to declare that proof
of one fact shall be prima facie evidence of another. It then stated the test which
the statute must pass in order to be consistent with due process. The test used was
a formulation of the Minnesota court in State v. Kelly28 which is in substantial
conformity with the "rational connection" approach in Turnipseed,29 Tot,30 Can-
non,31 and Fitzpatrick.32 Next, the court applied the test to the statute before itss
and found that there was a rational connection between carrying pistols without
a license to do so and intending crimes of violence. Finally, the court examined the
significance which the trial court attached to the statutory presumption and, finding
error here in the instruction, set aside the conviction and remanded for new trial.
On retrial, the trial court would be required to explain the phrase, prima face
evidence, in such manner as to make it clear to the jury that it need give only
such weight to the prima facie evidence of intent as it seems to the jury to merit.
It is believed that, in light of the decisions discussed above, the correctness
21 Id. at 876.
22 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
23 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
24 156 Wash. 198, 286 Pac. 81 (1930).
25 Id. at 84.
26 56 Wash.2d 283, 352 P.2d 189 (1960).
27 364 P.2d 930 (Wash. 1961).
28 218 Minn. 247, 15 N.W. 2d 554 (1944).
29 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
30 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
31 139 N.Y. 32, 34 N.E. 759 (1893).
32 141 Wash. 638, 251 Pac. 875 (1927).
33 WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.41.030 (1956).
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of the present case, insofar as it acknowledged the power of the legislature to act
in this area and adopted the rational connection test, must be conceded. As is
the case in most instances which require the application of broad principles to a
particular situation, the real core of this case is finding justification for a decision
that the statutory presumption in this case met the standard of validity. The court
was satisfied that because of the ease with which a license to carry a pistol for a
lawful reason may be obtained, the failure to obtain such a license permits the
inference that such a failure connotes an unlawful purpose. But that is all the court
need find, that is, that whatever the precise motive and grounds of the legislature
were in -enacting the statute, as long as the court can find that there is some basis
in reason for concluding the relationship probably exists in human experience,
then the court should not superimpose its judgment on that of the legislature. It
seems fairly obvious that the Washington tribunal in this instance found that if
a person risks the chance of prosecution for carrying an unlicensed pistol, human
experience has shown that he probably does so with an intent to commit a crime
of violence.
Furthermore, the court very carefully pointed out the language of the statute
before it. There are at least three elements of fact which must be shown by the
prosecution before the establishment of the prima facie case as to intent exists:
1.) the accused must have been involved in a crime of violence or an attempt to
commit same;'2.) he must have been armed with a pistol at that time; and 3.) he
must not have had a license to carry the pistol. Conceding the proof of those ele-
ments, it follows, by the construction of the Washington court,3 4 that the intent
to commit is deemed to be reasonably inferred. Under such close analysis, it can
be observed that this statute does not jeopardize the rights of the citizen who is
arrested for carrying an unlicensed pistol while simply walking along the street.
Arming oneself with a pistol without a license to do so is only one factor in the
application of the statute. It must be coupled with the commission or attempted
commission of a crime of violence. In other words, there must be an overt act in
furtherance of the commission or attempt to commit the crime. Under that cir-
cumstance, it is posited that the great majority of cases will present facts, over
and above the statutory presumption, from which the jury can find the requisite
intent. Because of this, any possible danger in this type of statute is modified to a
very considerable extent.
The jury is entitled to consider this prima facie evidence "for what it may
be worth. ' 'S5 There is no compulsion on the jury to find the existence of the re-
quisite intent beyond a reasonable doubt and it need give the inference "only
such weight on the issue of intent as it seems to merit."
3 6
If examined in a vacuum, the decision in the Thomas case would seem to go
quite far in acceding to the will of the legislature. But if the decision is examined
in light of the previous pronouncements of the court as to the effect of the statute
and others like it, it is believed that because of the total lack of conclusiveness
on the decision of the jury of these statutes, in conjunction with clear instructions
by the trial courts to this effect, the possibilities of danger to liberty are strictly
limited.
It should be remembered that the basic fact from which the prima facie evi-
dence of intent is deemed to arise by reasonable inference, arming oneself with
a pistol without 'a license to do so, is not an innocent actA, In and of itself it is
a violation of statute.3 7 This lack of innocence sharply increases the probability
34 State v. Rouw, 156 Wash. 198, 286 Pac. 81 (1930).
35 State v. Thomas, supra note 27, at 932.
36 Id. at 933.
37 WASH. Rav. Cona § 9.41.050 (1956), provides: "No person shall carry a pistol in any
vehicle or conceal on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business,
without a license therefor as hereinafter provided."
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that the criminal intent existed in the mind of the accused. Such preponderance of
probability is the basis for every genuine presumption.3 8
George W. Vander Vennet, Jr.
HOUSING - STATE LEGISLATIVE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN PRIVATE
HOUSING - DEMISE OF LEGISLATION DEPENDENT UPON GOVERNMENT LOAN IN-
SURANCE. - Statutes barring discrimination in the sale or rental of private housing
which is publicly assisted in that it is or was financed with the aid of federal or
state government loan insurance or guarantee' or that a commitment for such
government assistance has been issued for it have been enacted in the past few
years in six states: California, 2 Massachusetts,3 New Jersey,4 New York,5 Oregon, "
and Washington." Such statutes are able to affect a large portion of the housing
market by virtue of the large number of housing units constructed or acquired
with the aid of the Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance and Vet-
erans Administration loan guarantee programs.8 The first state to enact such
legislation was New York in 1955,9 and the last was California in 1959.10 The New
York" and New Jersey' 2 statutes were upheld in court tests. Yet the trend ap-
pears to be away from such legislation and toward legislation which prohibits dis-
crimination in private housing regardless of any public assistance but which applies
only to housing of a commercial nature, i.e., (1) one and two family dwellings
which are located on contiguous lots owned or controlled by the same developer
and (2) multiple dwellings. Since 1959, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York
and Oregon have amended their housing discrimination statutes to this effect.
13
The older provisions relating to publicly-assisted housing remain in force, with the
exception of Oregon, but they exist in the shadow of the more inclusive amend-
ments. And in California, during the 1961 legislative session, efforts were made
to amend that state's housing discrimination statute to apply to private housing
regardless of public assistance.14 Since 1959, five other states have adopted legisla-
tion barring discrimination in the sale or rental of commercial private housing re-
gardless of public assistance without having taken the intermediate step of barring
38 Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1918).
1 Throughout this article, the term "publicly-assisted" will be used to refer only to this
type of government assistance, and the term "publicly-assisted housing" will be used exclusively
to refer to private housing given this type of assistance.
2 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-41 (Supp. 1961).
3 Mass. Acts & Resolves 1959, ch. 239, § 2, at 159 (now MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, §
4(6) (Supp. 1961)).
4 Laws of New Jersey 1957, ch. 66, §§ 1-2, at 128 (now amended and supplemented by
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:25-4, 18:25-5(1) to (n), 18:25-9.1, 18:25-12(g) to (i) (1961 NEW
JERSEY SESSION LAW SERVICE, at 379)).
5 Laws of N.Y. 1955, ch. 341, at 980, and Laws of N.Y., 1956, ch. 563 §§ 1-2, at 1293
(now N.Y. ExECuTIvE- LAW §§ 290-96).
6 Oregon Laws, ch. 725, §§ 2-4 (1957) (now ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 659.031, 659.033
1959)).
7 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.010, .030, .040, .217 (1959).
8 For example, out of a total of 1,343,000 housing units built in multi-family structures
during the 11-year period from 1947 through 1957, 709,000 or nearly 53 percent,
were started with FHA assistance. REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 462
(1959). And less than two percent of the total number of new homes insured by the FHA
from 1946 to 1959 were available to members of minority groups. Id. at 463.
9 Laws of N.Y., 1955, ch. 341, at 980.
10 California Statutes, 1959, ch. 1681, § 1, at 4074.
11 New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, Inc., 10
Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
12 Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177
(1960), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal queston, 363 U.S. 418 (1960).
13 See notes 3-6, supra.
14 N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1961, § 8, p. 1, col. 8.
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discrimination in private housing financed with the aid of government loan in-
surance or guarantee.2
5
More recently, in O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination,'
the Washington Supreme Court may well have delivered the coup de grace to
housing discrimination legislation based on government loan insurance or guarantee,
by holding unconstitutional the Washington statute of that type. The Washington
statute, 7 amended to cover publicly-assisted housing in 1957,18 was moxe or .less
typical, except that it covered all publicly-assisted housing accommodations, in-
eluding noncommercial housing - even owner-occupied, one-family houses. It
provided that housing would be deemed to be publicly-assisted only as long as the
insured or guaranteed loan remained outstanding. "' Typically, it provided for an
administrative board with power to receive, investigate, and hold hearings on com-
plaints of unfair housing practices.20 If it found a person to have engaged in an.
unfair practice, the board was to issue an order requiring him to cease and de-
15 CoLo. Rzv. STAT. §§ 69-7-1 to -7 (Supp. 1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35(Connecticut Legislative Service, 1961, at 650); MINN. STAT. 363.01-.09, .12-.13 (effective as
relates to housing Dec. 31, 1962) (MINNESOTA SESSION LAW SERVICE, 1961, at 510); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-62, as amended by Laws 1961, Act No. 19 (Purdan's Pennsylvania
Legislative Service, 1961, at 42); a New Hampshire law of 1961, effective Aug. 29, 1961, bars
discrimination in the rental of an apartment in a building containing more than one dwelling
unit. Violations are punished by fine of from $10 to $100. No enforcement agency was created,
so the injured party must himself bring a court action in order to enforce the law. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 24, 1961, § 8, p. 1, col. 8.
16 30 U.S.L. WEEK 291 (Washington Sup. Ct., Sept. 29, 1961).
17 WAsr. REv. CODE ch. 49.60 (1959). The relevant sections are as follows:§ 49.60.030. The right to be free from discrimination because of race,
creed, color, or national origin is recognized as and declared to be a civil
right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:
(3) The right to secure publicly assisted housing without discrimination.
§ 49.60.040. As used in this chapter:
"Publicly-assisted housing" includes any building, structure or portion
thereof which is used or occupied or is intended to be used or occupied as
the home, residence or sleeping place of one or more persons, and the acqui-
sition, construction, rehabilitation, repair or maintenance of which is financed
in whole or in part by a loan, whether or not secured by a mortgage, the
repayment of which is guaranteed or insured by the federal government or
any agency thereof, or the state or any of its political subdivisions, or any
agency thereof, provided that such a housing accommodation shall be
deemed to be publicly-assisted only during the life of such loan and such
guarantee or insurance, or if a commitment, issued by a government agency,
is outstanding that the acquisition of such housing accommodations may be
financed in whole or in part by a loan, whether or not secured by a mort-
gage, the repayment of which is guaranteed or insured by the federal
government or any agency thereof, or the state or any of its political sub-
divisions, or any agency thereof;
"Owner" includes the owner, lessee, sublessee, assignee, agent, creditor,
lender or other person having the right to ownership or possession of housing,
or to have housing pledged as security for a debt.
§ 49.60.217. It shall be an unfair practice:(1) For the owner of publicly-assisted housing to refuse to sell, rent, or
lease to any person or persons such housing because of the race, creed, color,
or national origin of such person or persons;
(2) For the owner of any publicly-assisted housing to segregate, separate
or discriminate against any person or persons because of the race, creed,
color, or national origin of such person or persons, in the terms, conditions,
or privileges of any such housing or in the furnishing of facilities or services
in connection therewith;
18 Wash. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 37, at 107.
19 WASH. lEv. CODE § 49.60.040 (1959).
20 WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.60.050, 49.60.120 (1959).
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sist from such practice and- to take such affirmative action as would effectuate the
purposes of the statute.
21
The O'Mearas owned a single family home in Seattle which had been con-
structed over 20 years ago without government financing assistance, but which
the O'Mearas had financed, when they bought it in 1955, through a private loan
insured by the FHA. The loan was still outstanding when the O'Mearas placed the
house on the market in 1959. Jones, a Negro, attempted to purchase the house
and was refused. He filed a complaint with the State Board Against Discrimination,
charging that the O'Mearas had refused him because of his color. After a hear-
ing at which the O'Mearas were found to have committed an unfair practice
under the 1957 amendment, a tribunal of the Board ordered them either to accept
Jones' offer to buy the house or to make him a counter-offer.2 2 The O'Mearas
appealed the order to the Superior Court, which set it aside on the ground that
the O'Mearas' efforts to sell their house did not constitute "state action." 23 The
Board appealed, and the Washington Supreme Court now has held that the 1957
amendment barring discrimination in publicly-assisted housing was unconstitutionally
discriminatory under both the United States and Washington Constitutions.
The Superior Court opinion in O'Meara was based on the idea that, "the
state here, in order to prevail, must demonstrate that the complainant Jones lies
within the ambit of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment... [ivhich]
proscribes only state action." 24 The court concluded that it is "palpable sophistry to
argue that Commander O'Meara, in endeavoring to sell his home, is acting by,
for, or as the state. '25 The court thus ignored an express statutory declaration
that the Washington law against discrimination was an exercise of the police power
of the state.26 State laws against discrimination need not meet the standard set by
the Superior Court - that they may proscribe only such discriminatory action as
is state action. Such a standard would require that state laws against discrimination
be merely an affirmation of the pre-existing command of the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause.2 7 In fact, the amendment is a negative test under
which state laws which establish discrimination must be struck down,2 8 while the
test of state laws against discrimination is whether they are within the police power
of the state. The Washington lower court never reached this latter question, though
it discussed it inconclusively. 29
At least one writer has urged, after considering the lower court's O'Meara
opinion, that state laws prohibiting discrimination in publicly-assisted housing
should indeed be based on the civil rights guarded by the fourteenth amendment,
rather than on the police power of the state, in order to avoid what he termed
problems of arbitrary classification between housing owners who had benefited from
government loan insurance and those who had not. 0 But if an anti-discrimination
statute were based on the fourteenth amendment's prohibition of discriminatory
state action, its validity would be subject to a case by case determination according
to the amount of state action evidenced by the facts of each case, with the neces-
21 WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.250 (1959).
22 Robert L. Jones, 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 485 (1959) (Wash. State Bd. Against Discrimi-
nation, 1959).
23 O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 4 RACE REL. L. RP. 682
(1959) (Wash. Super. Ct. 1959).
24 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 682, 686 (1959).
25 Id. at 687.
26 WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.010 (1959).
27 "[N]or shall any State . .. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. xiv, § 1.
28 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (dictum).
29 For criticism of this aspect of the court's decision, see: Saks & Rabkin, Racial and
Religious Discrimination in Housing, 45 IowA L. REv. 488, 519-20 (1960); Forster & Rabkin,
The Constitutionality of Laws Against Discrimination in Publicly Assisted Housing, 6 N.Y.L.F.
38, 51-52 (1960).
30 Lehman, Must I Sell My House to a Negro?, 42 CHICAGO BAR REcoRD 283 (1961).
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sary amount being measured by the already tangled skein of "state action" pre-
cedents. A California lower court has held, in a case decided before California
legislatively barred discrimination in publicly-assisted housing, that a real estate
developer who was selling homes on which he had accepted FHA and VA com-
mitments to insure loans to be made to their future purchasers could not discrimi-
nate in selling them.3 ' The basis of the decision was that the nondiscriminatory
requirements applicable to the federal government 32 must also be imposed upon
private persons who control access to the benefits provided by the government,
since their action thus constitutes government action. This decision conceivably
opens the door to suits against FHA-VA-aided builders in any state, whether or
not state anti-discrimination legislation exists, especially in the case of large-scale
developers whose relationship with the FHA is admittedly close. But in two earlier
cases with somewhat similar facts, one decided by the Court of Appeals of New
York,33 the other by a federal district court,3 4 the results reached were diametrically
opposed to that of the California case. At any rate, although persons discriminated
against by an FHA builder might be able to secure relief without the assistance of
an anti-discrimination statute, by means of the rationale of the California case,
it is more logical, and certainly it is preferable from the standpoint of achieving
certainty, to attack the problem legislatively rather than to judicially expand the
already tortured concept of state (federal) action.
The Washington Supreme Court split five to four in affirming the lower court's
decision in O'Meara. An opinion written by Judge Foster and concurred in by
two judges stated that the reasoning of the lower court was adopted as the opinion
of the Supreme Court. But remarkably enough neither this opinion, nor the con-
curring opinion of two other judges, nor the dissenting opinions, adverted to or
commented upon the lower court's erroneous premise regarding the requirement
of state action. Instead, the Foster opinion quoted that portion of the lower court
opinion which was devoted to the conclusion that the law prohibiting discrimina-
tion in publicly-assisted housing created an unconstitutionally arbitrary classification.
Although this appears to have been merely a supplementary basis for the lower
court's decision, it is the sole basis of the Foster opinion. The gist of the argument,
based upon a dictum of Justice Holmes,' 5 is that the law applies to housing owners
who have an outstanding loan guaranteed by a government agency and does not
apply to those owners who do not, while "there is no reason to suppose that per-
sons with FHA mortgages on their homes are more likely to discriminate against
minority groups than those who have conventional mortgages or no mortgages.
. . . "1 On the other hand, the dissenters pointed out that when a legislature
chooses to correct a given evil, it may proceed step by step and need not try to
correct all of the evil at once, but may classify objects of legislation by degrees
of evil. They then stated that a reasonable ground for distinction did exist in the
O'Meara case since discrimination is particularly odious, "in the case of a sale by
one to whom the public (including those discriminated against) has lent its aid
in acquiring his ownership. '"3 7 Similar contentions of arbitrary classification were
raised in the two earlier cases upholding statutes barring discrimination in publicly-
assisted commercial housing. In answer, one court pointed out that the legislature
31 Ming v. Horgan, 3 RAcn REL. L. REP. 693 (1958) (Cal. Super Ct. 1958).
32 See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
33 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 981 (1950).
34 Johnson v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
35 "[I]f the class discriminated against is or reasonably might be considered to define those
from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked out." Patsone v. Penn-
sylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914).
36 O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 365 P.2d 1, 5 (Wash. 1961).
37 O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 365 P.2d 1, 10 (Wash.
1961) (dissenting opinion). For a discussion of this and other bases for the distinction,
including the argument that discrimination could be more easily controlled in publicly-
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could reasonably have chosen to achieve its objective of opening housing up to
minority groups through a measure affecting only the one kind of private housing
most easily financed and in which existing patterns would be least disturbed s5
The other court declared that in eliminating discrimination in affairs closely con-
nected with the personal lives of the citizens, it was not only reasonable but neces-
sary in the interest of the public welfare that the legislature proceed step by step.39
The latter argument has been somewhat weakened by the subsequent enactment of
legislation barring discrimination in private housing by several states which had
not previouily taken the step of barring discrimination in publicly-assisted hous-
ing.40 A further classification problem, which apparently was not raised in O'Meara
or the two earlier cases, exists in the distinction made between housing on which
a government insured or guaranteed loan is still outstanding and housing which
was constructed or acquired with the aid of such a loan which has since been fully
repaid.
In any case, the O'Meara court, perhaps somewhat influenced by the fact
that it applied to owner-occupied single-family homes, has declared the Washington
publicly-assisted housing statute to be unconstitutional. This leaves California as
the sole remaining state whose statutory bar against discrimination in private hous-
ing is dependent upon the existence of government loan insurance or guarantee.
Whether or not one agrees with the decision in the O'Meara case, the decision,
added to the trend noted above toward extending housing discrimination statutes
to commercial private housing regardless of public assistance, seems to have marked
the end of the brief period of prominence enjoyed by legislation prohibiting dis-
crimination in publicly-assisted housing.
Moreover, in its recently issued second report the United States Commission
on Civil Rights recommended that the President should issue an executive order
banning discrimination by builders, brokers and banks participating in FHA-VA
programs.41 It had been reported even before the Commission report appeared
that such an executive order would probably be issued.42 If such a step is taken,
legislation prohibiting discrimination in publicly-assisted housing would become
somewhat unnecessary. The present policy of the FHA is to withhold its benefits
from a discriminatory builder only when state authorities have found him to have
violated a state anti-discrimination law and he has refused to amend his discrimi-
natory practices. The FHA has not yet been occasioned to implement this policy,
though, because the requisite combination of facts has not yet occurred. 43
Although a lower court has summarily upheld the pioneering New York City
ordinance, 44 the constitutionality of state laws which prohibit discrimination in
commercial private housing regardless of public assistance remains to be judicially
tested. Nine states now have some form of fair housing law, as these statutes are
assisted housing (although this would seem to be true only where the operation of the
anti-discrimination law was limited to commercial housing), see: Forster & Rabkin, The Con-
stitutionality of Laws Against Discrimination in Publicly Assisted Housing, 6 N.Y.L.F. 38, 56-
57 (1960); Saks & Rabkin, Racial and Religious Discrimination in Housing, 45 IowA L. Rxv.
488, 521 (1960).
38 Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177
(1960), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 363 U.S. 418 (1960).
39 New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, Inc., 10
Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
40 See note 15 supra.
41 N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1961, p. 1, col. 4. The Commission further recommended that the
President or Congress should require nondiscrimination by federally regulated, aided or super-
vised banks and savings and loans associations. But the Commission's recommendations would
not prevent individual homeowners from discriminating in the sale of their homes. Ibid.
42 N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1961, p. 1, col. 2.
43 Id., Oct. 8, 1961, p. 55, col. 1.
44 Martin v. New York, 22 Misc. 2d 389, 201 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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called.45 A discussion of the constitutionality of such statutes is beyond the scope
of this comment, but it appears that they are a proper exercise of the police power
of the states.4 . In a separate dissenting opinion filed in the O'Mearg case, Judge
Hill wrote as follows on this point:
* * * A great public need exists to end this housing discrimination.
I am convinced that the police power, the least limitable of the powers
of government, already so extensively used to subordinate the rights of
property ownership and of cortract where they conflict with the public
interest, [citing zoning ordinances as an example] can be properly exercised
to meet that need. I do not think its exercise requires the crutch of publicly-
assisted housing. The prohibition should be directed against discrimination,
and not against discrimination by some particular group based on their
method of financing.47
The classification made by most fair housing statutes between commercial and
noncommercial housing s certainly seems valid. One reason is that state legislatures
may reasonably decide to proceed step by step in correcting an evil.4 9 Secondly, an
anti-discrimination statute clearly can be more feasibly enforced against apartment
owners and developers than against individual homeowners. Most important, such
classification may achieve the desired end, i.e., adequate housing opportunity for
minority groups, while avoiding the regulation of individual homeowners in the
sale of their own homes - regulation which could increase opposition to the en-
actment of fair housing laws, increase racial tensions by its enforcement, and per-
haps provoke judicial diligence in finding reasons for holding fair housing laws
unconstitutional.
Paul J. Driscoll
MUTUAL FUNDS - VIOLATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT BY DIRECTORS
- RIGHT OF ACTION BY SHAREHOLDERS HELD TO EXIST BY IMPLICATION. -
A question bearing heavily on the extent to which investment companies and
their management are to be regulated has been posed by a pair of antithetical
decisions of United States Circuit Courts.' Summarized, the question is: Has
directors' liability to registered investment companies which they serve been created
by implication in the Investment Company Act of 1940?2
The problem is raised primarily because there are relatively few express pro-
45 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 69-7-1 to -7 (Supp. 1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 53-35
(Connecticut Legislative Service, 1961, at 650); MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B,, § 4(6) (Supp.
1961); MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.09, .12-.13 (Minnesota Session Law Service 1961, at 510);
New Hampshire, see note 15 supra; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:25-4, 18:25-5(1)-(n), 18:25-9.1,
18:25-12(g)-(i) (1961 New Jersey Session Law Service, at 379); N.Y. ExEcuT VE LAW §§
290-96; ORE. Rnv. STAT. §§ 659.031, 659.033 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-62, as
amended by Laws 1961, Act. No. 19 (Purdon's Pennsylvania Legislative Service, 1961, at 42).
46 On this point, see Saks & Rabkin, Racial and Religious Discrimination in Housing, 45
IowA L. Rav. 488, 521-22 (1960); 45 VA. L. REv. 428 (1959); Lehman, Must I Sell My
House to a Negro?, 42 OucAco B. REcoan 283, 288 (1961).
47 O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 365 P.2d 1, 13 (Wash.
1961) (dissenting opinion). (Footnote omitted.)
48 The New York statute, for example, applies to dwellings rented to be occupied as the
residence of three or more families (not counting the family Of the owner if it lives there)
'living independently of each other, and to any housing accommodation which is among ten or
more housing accommodations located on land that is contiguous and which is offered for sale
or rent by a person who owns or otherwise controls the sale or rental of such ten or more
accommodations. N.Y. EXEcUTIvE LAW §§ 292(12), 296(5)(a).
49 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); New York State
Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, Inc., 10 Misc. 2d 334, 170
N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
1 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Brouk v. Managed Funds, 286 F.2d
901 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 958 (1961). The Brouk case was decided on.
January 13, 1961, and the Brown case on September 5, 1961.
2 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a(1)-(52) (1958).
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visions in the 1940 Act making directors liable to private actions. 3 Aggrieved stock-
holders apparently feel that the express civil liability provisions of the 1940 Act,(including provisions vesting rights of action in the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission), and its criminal provisions, are inadequate to compensate stockholders
and corporations for damages caused by directors in dereliction of duty.4 As a
result, litigants have utilized the common law tort action based upon violation of
a statute.5 The doctrine is enunciated in the Restatement of Torts:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or
by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an
interest of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an
interest of the other as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to
protect; and
(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a par-
ticular hazard,- the invasion of the interests results from that hazard; and
(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has
not so conducted himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action.'
Since the interest invaded must be one which the enactment is intended to
protect, a violation results in no civil liability where the enactment is designed
exclusively to protect the interests of the state or the public as a whole.7
Whether civil liability is implied is a question which is enmeshed with juris-
dictional problems in the federal courts. The question does not arise in regard tojurisdiction where jurisdiction in a suit is founded on diversity of citizenship.8 The
problems do arise, however, where jurisdiction is founded on a "federal queston."9
There the matter in controversy must "arise under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States."'1 In order to establish that a right of action arises under
a federal statute it must be shown that the plaintiff's interest was one the statute,
or a particular provision thereof, .was designed to protect. Where the statute ex-
plicitly announces this protection, there is less difficulty than where the statute
is silent on the matter. In cases where the statute is silent, the district court must
decide whether or not the statute was intended to afford the plaintiff's interest pro-
tection. If it decides in the affirmative, civil liability arises and the jurisdictional
issue is settled.
Bringing this discussion, then, out of the abstract to the specific jurisdictional
problem under the Investment Company Act, it may be asked, in the absence of
express 6ivil liability provisions of a satisfactory nature, if civil liability may be
implied from provisions of the 1940 Act. As noted above, two federal circuit courts
recently have spoken on this point, reaching decisions of a contrary nature.
In Brouk v. Managed Funds," Judge Woodrough in the Eighth Circuit Court
3 Section 30 (f) of the Act, 54 Stat. 836 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (1958), incorporates
by reference the civil liability clause of section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat.896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (p) (1958), relating to recovery of insiders' short-swing trading
profits. There is belief that sections 44, 24 (e) (3), 17 (h) and 38 (c) are express civil liabil-
ity provisions. See 1961 DuxE L.J. 431 and Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, pp. 11-12,
Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
4 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Brouk v. Managed Funds, 286 F.2d901 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 958 (1961); Chabot v. National Securities and
Research Corp., 290 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1961).
5 Ibid.
6 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934).
7 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1044 (1951).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958).
10 Ibid.
11 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 958 (1961).
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of Appeals ordered the dismissal of consolidated actions against investment company
directors. According to the court, the Investment Company Act did not expressly
or by implication impose any statutory duty upon directors of an investment com-
pany, whose violation would give rise to a private cause of action by the company
against the directors within the jurisdiction of a federal district court. In Brown
v. Bullock, 5 however, a case decided just eight months after the Brouk case, Judge
Friendly of the Second Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in affirming a refusal
to dismiss an action by shareholders of a mutual fund against fund directors. 33
The court held that a complaint alleging that directors acted in the interests of
a management company in which they were also directors rather than in the
interest of the fund stated federal claims under separate provisions of the Invest-
ment Company Act making it a crime to convert assets of the company and re-
quiring the annual approval of investment advisory and underwriting contracts.'4
Brown v. Bullock', appears to be the most significant case yet on the subject
of implied civil liability under the Investment Company Act, although it may be
pointed out that cases in the area have not been too numerous. Doyle v. Milton,"6
a 1947 district court case, involved a suit by stockholders to disenfranchise a holding
company which, as alleged by the stockholders, was used by directors of the in-
vestment company to control the investment company. The stockholders alleged
that the device employed by the directors was that of pyramiding, in contravention
of section 1 (b) of the Investment Company Act. 7 Section 1 (b) contains no
express civil liability provision. The court made these comments:
The Investment Company Act is a carefully framed statute in which
Congress has, with particularity, stated the means and methods, both judi-
cial and administrative, by which its declaration of policy is to be executed.
It has not confided in the courts a broad discretion to shape judicially
contrived remedies for the mischief it has discovered. Insofar as power is en-
trusted to the courts under this Act its exercise must, of course, be steered
toward the fulfillment of the national policy as declared. The policy itself,
however, when declared in a statute as comprehensive and detailed as
this Act, does not authorize the courts to fashion sanctions withheld by
Congress.
In the case at bar, . . . the court is asked to . .. assume that Con-
gress has inadvertently omitted the power to disenfranchise and that the
court should supply the omission. All the internal evidence points in-
escapably to the conclusion that the omission is deliberate. Were the
court to supply it they would engage not only in judicial lawmaking
where Congress is silent but in overruling the Congressional mandate.' s
The defendant's motion to dismiss was granted. Subsequently, in Breswick &
12 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
13 The lower court order was certified by the district court judge, under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (1958), as a case inv6lving "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion," and hence as a case needing appellate determination. Said
the appellate court: "This Court... granted leave to appeal.. . believing that determination
in limne of the issue of Federal jurisdiction, an issue of first impression in this Circuit, . . .
was likely to have precedential value for a large number of other suits against directors of
registered investment companies now pending in the Southern District. .. "
14 The approach thus taken has the wholehearted approval of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.
1961).
15 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
16 73 F.Supp. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
17 Section 1 (b) says in part:
[lit hereby is declared that the national public interest and the interest of
investors are adversely affected - (4) when the control of investment com-
panies is unduly concentrated through pyramiding or inequitable methods
of control .... 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 (1958).
18 Doyle v. Milton, 73 F.Supp. 281, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). According to Judge Her-
lands' district court opinion in Brown v. Bullock, 194 F.Supp. 207, 228: The conclusion
reached in the Doyle case [i.e., that the omission of the power to disenfranchise was deliberate]
has no bearing on the availability of the conventional remedy of accounting sought herein....
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Co. v. United States,19 stockholders of an investment company sued to enjoin the
enforcement of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission recognizing the com-
pany as a carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, rather than as an in-
vestment company subject to the provisions of the Investment Company Act. On
the matter of the plaintiffs' rights under the Investment Company Act the court
said:
One of the purposes of the Investment Company Act is thus to pro-
tect investors in investment companies against the managing of those com-
panies in the interests of persons other than the investors ...
The stockholders here allege that, by obtaining an erroneous ruling
from the I.C:C., persons in control of the corporation have succeeded in
escaping the provisions of an act passed for the express purpose of protect-
ing stockholders from persons in control. Since the corporation, by hypo-
thesis, is helpless, plaintiffs say that they have standing to sue to prevent
the thwarting of the declared will of Congress. We are convinced that a
stockholder, who seeks only that which Congress has provided for him as
matter of right, need not show money damage to entitle him to sue.20
In a 1958 case, Cogan v. Johnston,21 a stockholder brought suit to enjoin an
investment company from operating unregistered in violation of the Investment
Company Act, to enjoin. officers and directors from continuing in those capacities,
and to secure the appointment of a receiver or trustee to enable the company to
comply with the Act. The complaint alleged that the officers and directors were
engaged in a continuing conspiracy to freeze out the company's public stockholders,
were causing the company to violate the Act in their own interests and were guilty
of gross abuse of trust. The court found that "jurisdiction was properly invoked
under Section 44 of the Investment Company Act, which grants to the district
court jurisdiction of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation of, the Act or the rules,
regulations or orders thereunder." 22 However, the court denied that jurisdiction
could be predicated by the plaintiff on Section 36 of the Act, which authorizes the
SEC to seek an injunction against an officer or director of a registered investment
company on the basis of gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust. The court said:
Whatever relief the plaintiff may be entitled to, he may not, as an in-
dividual, sue under this section on the basis of alleged abuse of trust by
an officer or director of an unregistered investment company, to enjoin the
officer or director from holding his office. 22
Finally, in Taussig v. Wellington Fund,24 the Delaware District Court enter-
tained a suit for a declaratory judgment on the part of minority stockholders of an
investment company who contended that the corporation in which they were in-
vestors should be adjudged rightful user of the name "Wellington." They con-
tended that another investment company was employing the same name. The court
held:
Since the common law causes of action accord plaintiffs complete
vindication of the derivative rights they assert, orderly judicial process re-
19 134 F.Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), Rev'd sub. nom. Allegheny Corp. v. Breswick &
Co., 353 U.S. 151 (1956), on other grounds. The court speaks in terms of whether the orders
of the ICC should be sustained. There is, however, no indication of disagreement with the
district court's contentions on the extent of investor's rights under the Investment Company
Act, as the following passage, at:174, would indicate:
Reliance on the alleged benefits of protection under the Investment Com-
pany Act subtly begs the question .... The fact that there may be another
Act that gives appellees greater protection as investors is immaterial to the
appelees right to a hearing in the merger-status order proceeding. The
question here is whether the proposed transaction falls within the Inter-
state Commerce Commission's jurisdiction, not what the consequences will
be if it does not.
20 Breswick & Co. v. United States, 134 F.Supp. 132, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
21 162 F.Supp 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
22 Id. at 909.
23 Ibid.
24 187 F.Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960).
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quires that the court abstain from ruling on the substance of the admittedly
novel federal claims until a more propitious occasion, where, perhaps, the
adjudicating tribunal will be in a better position to enlist the assistance
of an administrative agency's expertise, or, at least, until the law in the
area has crystallized.2s
Nevertheless, in dicta the court maintained:
Violation of a federal statute may accord a private litigant a remedy
by implication notwithstanding the absence of specific statutory authority
conferring upon the injured the right to redress statutory wrongs, for the
common law will supply a remedy where the statute is silent. The intention
to create civil liability is presumed unless a contrary legislative intent is
to be inferred from the whole purview of the Act.
26
It was in the context of these cases that Brouk v. Managed Funds,27 and Brown
v. Bullock 28 were decided.29 The significant passages of both the Breswick case and
the Taussig case are dicta, and thus are of doubtful precedential value, even though
they do indicate a trend of judicial thinking favorable to implied liability. The
Cogan case implies a cause of action under one provision and denies it under
another. The provision relied upon in implying liability is section 44 of the In-
vestment Company Act, which grants district courts jurisdiction in suits to enforce
duties and liabilities created by the act. There remains the crucial question as to
what duties and liabilities, found in what provisions of the act, are being en-
forced in Cogan. It is begging the question to base implied liability on section 44
without any explanation as to what specific provisions of the act are the source
of the duties asserted. The precedential value of Cogan is thus subject to consider-
able doubt, also. Finally, the Doyle case must be regarded with a mind to the
peculiar remedy sought therein. It does not seem strange that a court would find
much greater hesitation in implying a cause of action for disenfranchisement
as in implying a cause of action for the ordinary remedy of damages. Had the
plaintiffs in Doyle sought damages, a decision in their favor would have had
more significance than it does as it stands. As a group, the most that can be said
for these four cases is that they are some evidence, though slight, of an inclination
toward implied liability. That contrary decisioias were reached by the Brouk and
Brown courts is an indication that these four cases were somewhat less than con-
trolling in a clear and decisive manner.
The defendants in the Brouk action were officers and directors of the mutual
fund, the fund's investment adviser, two companies that sold the fund's shares, a
stock brokerage firm and former officers and directors of the fund. The plaintiffs
alleged that defendants committed, aided, or acquiesced in violations of the In-
vestment Company Act by (a) operating the fund in their own interest rather
than that of the fund's security holders; 30 (b) causing the fund to publish and
circulate documents containing untrue statements or omitting material facts;31
(c) causing the fund to deviate from its fundamental investment policy3 2 and
(d) permitting certain defendants to act as investment advisers without a written
contract approved by holders of the fund's outstanding voting securities.33 The
25 Id at 220. The plaintiff relied on provisions of several of the securities acts, including
section 34 (d) of the Investment Company Act, which makes it unlawful "for any registered
investment company hereafter to adopt as part of the name or title of such company . . . any
word or words which the commission finds and by order declares to be deceptive or mislead-
ing." 54 Stat. 840 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34 (1958).
26 Id. at 217.
27 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 958 (1961).
28 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
29 After the Brouk decision but before the Brown decision, Judge Friendly (who wrote the
latter decision) was faced with the same type of jurisdiction question as in those cases. Thejudge delayed a determination pending a decision of the Brown case. Chabot v. National Secur-
ities and Research Corp., 290 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1961).
30 , Alleged as a violation of 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (b) (1958).
31 Alleged as a violation of 54 Stat. 840 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-33 (1958).
32 Alleged as a violation of 54 Stat. 811 (1940),15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 (1958).
33 Alleged as a violation of 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (a) (1958).
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district court denied a motion to-dismiss the action and this appeal was prosecuted
by certain of the defendants described as "outside directors," that is, "directors
alleged to have had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged wrongful acts
of [other of the directors].13 4
After a review of the authorities, Judge Woodrough made this-statement:
On consideration of the whole record and citations we conclude the
claim stated against these appellants does not support the federal jurisdic-
tion. At common law directors are liable to exercise due care and are not
insurers. 13 Am. Jur. Corporation Sec. 990, pp. 943-944. The complaints
here substantially seek to hold these former directors to strict liability as
insurers. The Act they rely on not only contains no such provision but
plainly negates any intent to create such an innovation. The reliance upon
implication to support the jurisdiction is not justified in the face of the
legislative intent to exclude it.s 5
The district court was reversed with directions to dismiss the complaint as
to these "outside directors" for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. 6
Thus, at the time Brown v. Bullock3 7 was decided in the circuit court, only
a handful of decisions on the matter of implied liability under the 1940 Act was
available for consideration. Though faced with Brouk v. Managed Funds,3s a most
recent and persuasive case, Judge Friendly in Brown accorded it little weight, saying:
Appellants have cited to us Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 8 Cir.,
1961, 286 F.2d 901, certiorari granted 366 U.S. 958, 81 S.Ct. 1921, ap-
pellees seek to distinguish it as holding only that directors of registered in-
vestment companies are not liable as insurers. The opinion' does contain
some language of that sort, 286 F.2d at page 918, but we are by no means
certain the decision is adequately distinguished on that ground. So far as
it is not, we must respectfully disagree, to the extent indicated herein. 39
While, as the quote suggests, it is possible to distinguish Brown and Brouk,
it is questionable whether there is valid ground for making the attempt. The di-
rectors on whose behalf the complaint in Brouk was dismissed were "outside di-
rectors." The directors charged as defendants in Brown included individuals who
allegedly "participated and acquiesced in such transactions with knowledge or
notice of their wrongful character." 40 The difference between the conduct of the
directors in Brouk, who had actual or constructive knowledge of the wrongful acts,
and that of the directors in Brown, who acquiesced in the wrongful acts, if there
is any difference, would not appear to be decisive. The more reasonable approach
to the ttwo cases must be to regard them as contrary and to avoid attempts at
reconciling them.
The precise charge in Brown v. Bullock was that two of the directors of the
investment company, who at the same time were directors of the company's man-
agement company, dominated the remainder of the investment company's board
so as to cause the investment company to enter into contracts with the manage-
ment company alloting excessive fees to the management company for its services.
It was alleged by the plaintiff stockholders that the fee paid to the management
34 Brouk v. Managed Funds, 286 F.2d 901, 902 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 366 U.S.
958 (1961).
35 Id. at 918. The defendants, on appeal, in the Brouk case not only relied on this argu-
ment - that legislative history shows a complete absence of any legislative intent to create
such private actions- but also argued that the void contract theory of liability and the theory
of tort liability based on violation of a federal statute have been rejected in situations where
director liability to their corporation has been involved. While the Brouk court quoted exten-
gively from several cases upholding the latter position, it did not comment on the cases and
did not explicitly refer to this line of reasoning in its conclusion.
36 The Securities and Exchange Commission "believes that the Brouk case was incorrectly
decided and regards that decision as a substantial threat to investment company shareholder
protections under the Act." Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, pp. 11-12, Brown v. Bullock,
294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
37 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
38 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 958 (1961).
39 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 421-22 (2d Cir. 1961).
40 Id. at 419.
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company was greater than that paid by other investment companies to the man-
agement company, that in proxy statements the defendants had stated that the
arrangement with the management company was the same as those between other
investment companies and the management company and that, as a result, the
proxy statements were in violation of securities statutes and Securities and Ex-
change Commission rules promulgated thereunder.
Utilizing the common law tort doctrine of private action based upon viola-
tion of a statute, the court held that the complaint was sufficient to state federal
claims arising under sections 3741 and 15 (a) and (b)4 2 of the 1940 Act. Section
37 is a criminal provision making it a crime for a party to steal, unlawfully
abstract, unlawfully and willfully convert to his own use or to the use of an-
other or to embezzle the moneys, funds, securities, credits, property, or assets of
a registered investment company. Sections 15 (a) and (b) make it unlawful to
act as investment adviser or as principal underwriter of a registered investment
company for more than two years after the execution of a contract to that end,
unless continuance of the contract is specifically approved at least annually by the
board of directors or by vote of a majority of the outstanding securities of the
company.
With respect to section 37, Judge Friendly's discussion is restricted to the
issue of whether the defendants committed a violation of the provision. He does
not involve himself in a discussion of whether civil liability can be predicated on
the provision but merely leaves his affirmation of that fact to implication. With
respect to sections 15 (a) and (b), the civil liability issue is dealt with more
extensively. After "citing a portion of the Act's policy statement that indicates that
the Act was intended, among other things, for the protection of investors, the
court said:
When Congress mandated annual approval of investment advisory
and underwriting contracts, it must have been concerned with the substance
and not simply with the form. It would scarcely seem consistent with the
declared Congressional purpose to hold that although a federal court would
have jurisdiction of a complaint alleging that the directors' approval had
come a few days late, or that notice of the directors' meeting had been
defective in some formal respect, the court lacks jurisdiction over a com-
plaint alleging that the directors' approval was given without any real con-
sideration of the merits. It is similarly unreasonable to suppose that Con-
gress would have wished to permit its purpose to protect investors in all
investment companies using the mails or the means of interstate commerce
to be frustrated if a particular state of incorporation should be satisfied with
lower standards of fiduciary responsibility for directors than those prevail-
ing generally. (Footnote omitted.) Indication of Congressional intent to
crdate a body of federal law giving rise to a distinctive federal claim has
been found from evidence less compelling than here. Textile Workers of
America v. Lincoln Mills, 1957, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972.
We think 15 (a) and (b) laid down a requirement of annual approval
not merely formal but substantial, the minimum content of which is a
matter of federal law; hence a complaint alleging failure to conform to
that requirement sets forth a federal claim.43
Judge Friendly seems to rely on a "Congress surely must have intended"
rationale. What Congress intended, however, is subject to dispute. Those who op-
41 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1958).
42 54 Stat. 812( 1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (a) and (b) (1958).
43 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1961). The 1940 Act includes a section
that in large part reiterates the "federal question" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958):
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of
any territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have jurisdiction of violations of this subchapter or the rules, regula-
tions, or orders thereunder, and, concurrently with state and territorial
courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liabil-
ity or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation of, this subchapter or the
rules, regulations, or orders thereunder ... 54 Stat. 844 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-43 (1958).
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pose the implication of civil liability will maintain that Congress, had it desired
private actions, would have expressly provided for them. Those who favor the
implication of civil liability will argue that Congress, being a fallible body, could
not have. been expected to anticipate all possible problems. One indication of Con-
gressional intent is the policy provision of the 1940 Act:
(b) [T]he national public interest and the interest of investors are
adversely affected-
(2) when investment companies are organized, operated, managed,
or their portfolio securities are selected, in the interest of directors, officers,
investment advisers,... underwriters,... or persons engaged in other
lines of business, rather than in the interest of all classes of such companies'
security holders. . .. 44
In concluding its policy statement; Congress said:
[T]he policy and purposes of this subchapter, . . . in accordance
with which the provisions of this subchapter ... shall be interpreted, are to
mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate the conditions enumerated
in this section which adversely affect the national public interest and the
interest of investors.45
It is undisputed that the Investment Company Act wag passed because of
malpractices by investment company officers and directors.4 In 1937 one authority
characterized the investment company field as "a playground for incompetent and
unscrupulous managers and promoters." 47 The reason generally cited for this
condition is the very nature of the assets of an investment company. Being com-
pletely liquid, mobile and readily negotiable, the assets afforded those in control
manifold opportunities for exploitation. 4
It is another matter to say that Congress intended to implement these ob-
jectives by writing in provisions it expected would be the subjects of suits im-
plying civil liability. The Securities and Exchange Commission, a body stiongly
in favor of a Brown v. Bullock49 result, has admitted that the legislative history
of the 1940 Act is devoid of any discussion of the implied private cause of action
doctrine.5 0 Some authorities say that this omission was deliberate - that Congress
never intended implied causes of action to arise under the act.5 ' Whatever one's
view, it cannot be challenged that the Senate and House Reports on the bill are of
little assistance in settling this issue.52
One factor which can be taken into consideration is the development of the
doctrine of implied liability under securities statutes other than the Investment
Company Act. While it may be said that cases, arising under these statutes have
no bearing on problems arising under the Investment Company Act, since each
statute must be viewed individually, 'the statutes do form an overall scheme of
securities regulation.5 3 There are numerous cases allowing the implication of civil
44 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 (1958). This section has been characterized as
a "frame of reference" for the problems of interpretation involved in Brown v. Bullock. Brown
v. Bullock, 194 F.Supp, 207, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
45 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 (1958). In Brown v. Bullock, 194 F.Supp. 207,
218 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), it was said: "This [section] is more than -a mere exordium. It is a
directive to the courts."
46 H.R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 7 (1940).
47 46 YALE L.J. 1214 (1937).
48 86 'CONG. REC. 10072 (1940).
49 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
50 Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 27, Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.
1961).
51 Brouk v. Managed Funds, 284 F.2d 901, 912 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 366 U.S.
958 (1961); Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WAsH. U.L.Q. 303, 346-47
(1941), where it is said:
It was not intended that the Act should be a complete cure of all possible
evils in the investment company field. It seemed wiser to proceed cautiously
and experimentally, attempting to prevent the main abuses which have been
known to exist.
52 H.R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 7 (1940); 86 CONG. REc. 10072 (1940).
53 The Investment Company Act of 1940 is the fifth in a series of six Congressional enact-
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liability under, for example, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.54 According
to one source:
The most surprising development in the whole area of civil liabilities under
the federal (securities) statutes has been the recognition in recent years of
what might be termed the implied liabilities. There is good reason to
believe that these may turn out to be far more significant than the express
liabilities which Congress created.55
An extensive review of these cases is unnecessary. Several may be pointed out
as illustrative. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,56 a complaint charging a con-
spiracy between the defendants for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to sell
his stock for less than value was held to statd a cause of action by implication
under section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule X-10B-5. The
court said there:
Where, as here, the whole statute discloses a broad purpose to regulate
securities transactions of all kinds and, as a part of such regulation, the
specific section in question provides for the elimination of all manipulative or
deceptive methods in such transactions, the construction contended for by
the defendants may not be adopted. In other words, in view of the general
purpose of the Act, the mere omission of an express provision for civil
liability is not sufficient to negative what the general law implies.57
In Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp.,S an investor was held to have a cause
of action under section 7 (c) of the 1934 Act5 against a broker who arranged loans
for the plaintiff in an amount greater than that permitted by law.
In Fratt v. Robinson"0 a complaint stated a cause of action under section 10
of the 1934 Act that alleged that majority stockholders acquired corporate stock
from a minority stockholder through fraudulent representations. The court relied
on "the weight of authority"'6 and "the best reasoning."62
Finally, a noteworthy case decided in 1956 presents an instance where a court
refused to imply civil liability. In Howard v. Furst,6" a stockholders' derivative suit
ments relating to securities. The first four acts were the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74
(1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1958), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881
(1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1958), the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49
Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a-z, (1958), and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat.
1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 aaa-bbbb (1958). The sixth act was the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b(1)-(21) (1958). Brouk v. Managed
Funds, 286 F.2d 901, 905 (8th Cir. 1961), cer.t. granted, 366 U.S. 958 (1961).
54 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F.Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Remar v.
Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F.Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
69 F.Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
55 Loss, SECURITIES RFGULATION 1043 (1951).
56 69 F.Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
57 Id. at 514. A second ground of recovery in Kardon was the void contract theory, that
is, that where the statute provides that a contract made in violation of the act Ss void it is
reasonable to assume that the legislature intended there be a remedy in respect of the void
contract. The Brouk court, however, seemed to ignore the common law tort action arising from
violation of a statute and to fasten upon the void contract approach. It said:
We do not express disagreement in any respect with the Kardon decision
and others-in accord with it. In Kardon the party damaged by a contract
obtained in violation of a federal law, which contract the law made void, was
allowed to sue in federal court the party who offended and profited. But we
do not hold the situation here to be analogous. 286 F.2d 901, 913 (1961),
cert. granted, 366 U.S. 958 (1961).
58 81 F.Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
59 7(c) makes it unlawful for a broker or dealer to extend or maintain credit or to arrange
for the maintenance of credit in contravention of the federal reserve rules. 48 Stat. 887 (1934),
15 U.S.C. § 78g (c) (1958).
60 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
61 Id. at 632.
62 Ibid.
63 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956). In Brown v. Bullock, 194 F.Supp. 207, 232 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), the court distinguished the Brown case from Howard on the following grounds: (1)
The 1934 Act was intended to regulate a commodity whereas the 1940 Act was intended to
regulate an industry. (2) The complaint in Brown sets forth a substantial federal claim, not
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was brought against officers and directors of a corporation alleging implied liability
under section 78aa of the 1934 Act.6 4 The plaintiffs contended that the defendants
sold the corporation's assets for less than value, in breach of fiduciary duties, and
that the sale was voted on with the use of misleading proxy statements. The suit
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The opinion stated:
As the case is said to be one "arising under" the laws of the United
States, our first inquiry is addressed to appellant's contention that the
statutory provisions above quoted create or give rise to a substantive civil
right on behalf on Circle, which may be enforced in a derivative action by
an individual stockholder. We reject this contention as unsound. We find
nothing in the language of 14 (a) or in the legislative history of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 to warrant an inference that it was the inten-
tion of the Congress to create any rights whatever in a corporation whose
stockholders may be solicited by proxy statements prepared in contraven-
tion of the statutory mandate. 65
Generally speaking, as these cases would indicate, there has been a tendency
in the courts to imply liability under the other securities statutes. The Howard case
seems to be the exception rather than the rule and even that case was distinguished
by the district court in the Brown case.
In view of the grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court in the Brouk case,
conjecture may be in order as to what view of the foregoing materials the high
court will take. As noted above, the legislative history does not clearly reveal the
intent of Congress. Cases under the Investment Company Act itself have been
neither numerous nor consistent in approach. Of the factors to be weighed, the
history of federal decisions on implied liability under the other securities acts seems
to wield the greatest influence. The majority of the cases imply liability.
Edmund John Adams
THE INTERSTATE INGREDIENT OF SECTION 304 (a) OF THE FEDERA FOOD,
DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT.
I. Introduction
In the science of mathematics, there exists the maxim that the whole is equal
to the sum of all of its parts. Recently, the United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit,' adopted this principle to expand the scope of the interstate commerce
requisite of section 304 (a) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. This
section concerns the grounds and jurisdiction for seizure under the Act. The perti-
nent part thereof reads:
Any article of food, drug, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded
when introduced into or while in interstate commerce or while held for sale
(whether or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce,
or which may not, under the provisions of section 404 or 505, be introduced
into interstate commerce, shall be liable to be prosecuted against while in
interstate commerce, or at any time thereafter, on libel of information and
condemned in any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction
of which the article is found. 2
a claim tacked onto a non-federal claim for purposes of creating a colorable federal question.
(3) The Brown suit was both representative and derivative, whereas the action in Howard was
only derivative. The court reasoned on this point that since the right to a fair proxy statement
is designed for the protection of stockholders and not for the corporation it is reasonable to
deny a derivative suit but not one both representative and derivative.
64 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1958). This provision is quite similar to section
44 of the 1940 Act, which is found at note 44 supra.
65 Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1956).
1 United States v. 40 Cases, More or Less, of Pinocchio Brand Oil, 289 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.
1961); cert. denied, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3113 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1961).
2 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law, § 304 (a), 52 Stat. 1044 (1938), as amended
by 62 Stat. 582 (1948), 21 U.S.C. § 334 (a) (1958). (Emphasis added to indicate new lan-
guage of the 1948 amendment.)
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In the case before the Second Circuit, there had been interstate and foreign
shipments of various vegetable and olive oils to the A. M. S. Packing Company
in Ozone Park, New York. At that point, the oils were blended and packaged
under the label, "25 per cent pure olive oil." Upon shipments to Syracuse, the
oil was seized by the Government and found to contain little or no olive oil. The
question before the Court of Appeals was whether section 304 (a) authorized the
United States to seize and proceed against misbranded3 cases of "Pinocchio"
blended oils, mixed entirely within the state of New York from components, shipped
in interstate commerce under proper labeling. Chief Judge Lumbard, reversing
the decision below, 4 answered: "The appellee would have us hold here that the
blending of the oils which had been transported in interstate commerce took the
final product out from under federal regulation although each of its separate com-
ponents was being held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce. We do
not agree." 5
This decision represents an ever broadening interpretation of what constitutes
interstate commerce,0 as the Food and Drug Administration seeks to extend the
range of the Federal Act.
Federal legislation in this area first came at the urgings of muckraking such
as that of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle and the militant interest that Dr. Harvey
W. Wiley, chief chemist of the United States Department of Agriculture from
1883 to 1912, took in the subject of adulteration of food and drink. The Pure Food
and Drug Act went into effect on June 30, 1906, and continued in force with the
help of various amendments until June 25, 1938.7 "[P]rofound changes in methods
of manufacturing and selling goods and drugs"' necessitated the enactment of an
entirely new law. The present Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act took a com-
prehensive look at the subject and notably expanded coverage to medical devices
and cosmetics.'
The validity of federal food and drug law rests on the commerce clause of
the Constitution, article I, section 8.10 Congress holds the right not only to regu-
late interstate commerce, but also possesses full power to keep the channels of
such commerce free from the transportation of harmful and illicit articles." Since
3 Section 403 (a), 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 343 (a) (1958) states that food
shall be deemed misbranded "if its labeling is false or misleading m any, particular." For a
further discussion of what constitutes misbranding, see 26 NOaRE DAME LAvn-WE 706 (1951).
4 188 F.Supp. 290 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
5 United States v. 40 Cases, Etc., supra note 1, at 345.
6 Section 201 (b), 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (b) (1958) defines interstate
commerce as: "(1) commerce between any State or Territory and any place outside thereof,
and (2) commerce within the District of Columbia or within any other Territory not organized
with a legislative body."
7 ARTHUR, THE LAW OF DRUGS AND DRuGGISTS 286 (4th ed. 1955). For a list of the
amendments to the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, see TOULMIN, LAW OF FOOD, DRUGS
AND COSMETICS § 3 (1942).
8 From Senator Copeland's report to the Senate on March 15, 1934, 78 CONG. REC. 4758
(1934).
9 See TOULMIN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 7 for a risum6 of the primary differences between
the Acts of 1906 and 1938. See generally Developments in the Law - The Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARvARD LAw REvIEw 632 (1954).
10 McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220
U.S. 45 (1911).
11 United States v. Cardiff, 95 F.Supp. 206 (E.D. Wash. 1951); United States v. Walsh,
331 U.S. 432, 434 (1947) states:
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act rests upon the Constitutional
power resident in Congress to regulate interstate commerce. To the end
that the public health and safety might be advanced, it seeks to keep
interstate channels free from deleterious, adulterated and misbranded
article of specific types. . . . It is in that interstate context that the
various sections of the Act must be viewed.
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the purpose of the Act is to protect the public health, the courts have consistently
declared that it should be given a liberal construction.1 2 The decision of Kordel v.
United States" issues a warning against the creation of loopholes at the expense
of public protection.
II. Predecessors of Section 304 (a): The Miller Amendment
Section 1014 of the original act addressed itself to the problem of federal juris-
diction in seizure of adulterated or misbranded food, drug, or liquor. In the early
case of Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States,"5 it was contended that section 10 of
the 1906 Act did not apply to an article of food which had not been shipped for
sale, but which had been shipped solely for use as a raw material in the manu-
facture of some other product. The Supreme Court refused to sustain such aposition: The object of the law is to keep adulterated articles out of the channels
of interstate commerce, or, if they enter such commerce, to condemn them
while being transported or when they have reached their destination, pro-
vided they remain unloaded, unsold or in original unbroken packages.
These situations are clearly separate, and we cannot unite or qualify them
by the purpose of the owner to be a sale.'
Prima facie, one may -think that seizure was valid only where the goods had
been adulterated before or while in interstate commerce. This simply was not so."
The courts appear to have adopted the position that the element of adulteration
of goods, remaining in the original unbroken packages was independent of the
interstate transportation factor and that interstate shipment was to be proved as
a condition precedent.' 8 Therefore, the Government maintained the viewpoint that
goods which were in an adulterated condition at the time of seizure were subject
to libel regardless of whether they were adulterated when transported, as long as
they had remained in the original packages. 19
When the new'law was enacted, the section under consideration was com-
12 United States v. 7 Jugs, 53 F.Supp. 746 (8th Cir. 1944).
13 335 U.S. 345 (1948).
14 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 771.
15 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
16 Id. at 54. (Emphasis added.)
17 See statement of Charles W. Crawford, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Commit-
tee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives on H.R. 3128 and H.R.
3147, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (147):
The old law authorized seizure of foods and drugs that became adulter-
ated or misbranded after interstate shipment if they remained unloaded,
unsold, or in original unbroken packages. Thousands of shipments of foods
and drugs that became filthy, debased, or deteriorated after interstate trans-
portation were seized and condemned under this provision and thereby were
prevented from reaching the consuming public. The authority to make
seizures in such circumstances was never challenged by court contest.
18 United States v. 300 'Cans of Frozen Eggs, 189 Fed. 351, 353 (2d Cir. 1911):
But the charge was against the goods in the original packages after trans-
portation was over. The applicable words of the Act are "or having been
transported remains unloaded, unsold, or in original unbroken packages."
The allegations as to the carriage of the goods between Nebraska and New
York were for the purpose of showing that they were the subject of interstate
coierce.
19 Kleinfield, Reflections on the Miller Amendment, 4 FOOD DRuo CosM. L.Q. 43, 45(1949).
20 Section 304 (a), 52 Stat. 1044 (1938) read in part:
Any article of food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or mis-
branded when introduced into or while in interstate commerce, or which
may not, under the provisions of section 404 or 505, be introduced into in-
terstate commerce, shall be liable to be proceeded against while in interstate
commerce, or at any time thereafter, on libel of information and condemned
in any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which the
article is found. (Emphasis added.)
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pletely revised and the words, "unsold, unloaded or in original unbroken packages,"
were excluded °.2  The new section 304 (a)21 contained two phrases worthy of
particular note: first, "when introduced into or while in interstate commerce,"
and second, "while in interstate commerce, or at any time thereafter." 22 These
phrases will be examined in inverse order.
It has already been observed that the Act of 1938 expanded the scope of
the former law and that it was generally intended to be farther-reaching than its
predecessor. The statuory language, "while in interstate commerce, or at any time
thereafter" appeared clear. It was believed that these words
were at least as inclusive as the language of the old law, "having been
transported [from one State to another], remains unloaded, unsold or in
original unbroken packages." There is nothing in the extensive legislative
history of the new act, including hearings, debates and committee reports,
or in 'the records of hearings before Appropriation Committees where this
kind of enforcement work was discussed, that reveals anything but approval
by the Congress and the regulated industries of the long-standing practice of
condemning goods which after interstate shipment became adulterated
while unsold or in original unbroken packages. 23
But when a United States Circuit Court of Appeals declared in United States
v. Phelps-Dodge Mercantile Co. that "the fact that the food was adulterated while
held in original packages did not show that it was adulterated when introduced
into or while in interstate commerce,"2 4 the seizure of an interstate shipment of
goods "at any time thereafter" was no longer possible.
Briefly, the facts in that case were these: food was shipped from Colorado to
Arizona and there held in the original packages for more than two years. But the
libel action by the government did not state that the food was adulterated "when
introduced into or while in interstate commerce"; to the contrary, it stated, in
effect, that the food was contaminated with filth while held in the original packages
in the appellee's warehouse. The court held that the terms "interstate commerce"
and "original packages" were not synonymous. It went on to say that this "original
package" provision of section 10 of the Wiley Food and Drug Act could not be
read into section 304 (a) of the 1938 Act, for that section had long since been
repealed and the new law made no mention of such words. By his narrow con-
struction of section 304 (a), Circuit Judge Mathews boldly terminated the Govern-
ment's exercise of an authority which had existed (or had been thought to exist)
for 40 years,25 viz., to seize food and drug products that became adulterated or mis-
branded while held for sale after interstate transportation.
It is interesting to note the decision in United States v. Olsen2 6 which Judge
Mathews handed down eight months subsequent to his Phelps-Dodge opinion. He
there held that where a therapeutic device was misbranded, although not in-
herently dangerous, when introduced into and while in interstate commerce, the
Government was within its rights to seize and condemn it, despite the fact that it
was no longer in interstate commerce. In fact, the device was in the hands of an
individual purchaser who was satisfied with it.
Charles Wesley Dunn theorized from the Olsen and United States v. Sullivan2 T
decisions (the latter of which is considered below) and "the broad concept of 'ir-
terstate commerce7 in other Federal laws and cases, that the Commerce Clause
does more or less sanction the incidental application of this Act to a food or drug
21 Ibid.
22 See Kleinfield, The Seizure Section of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 2
FOOD DRUo Cosm. L.Q. 21 (1947).
23 Hearing on H.R. 3128 and H.R. 3147, supra note 17, at 3.
24 157 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1946); cert. denied, 330 U.S. 818 (1946).
25 Hearing on H.R. 3128 and H.R. 3147, supra note 17, at 2. See also 94 CONG. R c. 134(1948).
26 161 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1947); cert. denied, 332 U.S. 768 (1947).
27 United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
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(etc.) which becomes adulterated or misbranded while it is held for intrastate sale
after its interstate shipment. 2 8
Had the Phelps-Dodge fact situation been delayed in presentation to Judge
Mathews another year or more, one may speculate that legal reasoning might have
spun its fine theories in extending the scope of section 304 (a) to allow an opposite
result. Yet, as they stand, there is no inconsistency between the two opinions of
Judge Mathews. In the Phelps-Dodge case, the point of his concern was that there
was neither proof nor allegation that the adulteration had occurred in interstate
commerce, while in the Olsen case, misbranding was shown to have taken place
prior to the interstate shipment. It, therefore, followed, by giving effect to the words
of the statute, that this device could be seized "at any time thereafter." What the
judge balked at in the Phelps-Dodge decision is a situation that appeared to be
strictly an intrastate matter with no established key in law to permit federal en-
trance. 29 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had done nothing more than care-
fully scrutinize the meaning of section 304 (a).
III. The Miller Amendment of 1948
The Food and Drug Administration's reaction to the Phelps-Dodge loophole
was immediate, the final result of which was an amendment to the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act.30 In recommending the amendment, it was noted that the
Phelps-Dodge decision revealed
a serious defect in the present law. Approximately 20 per cent of the
seizures of adulterated and misbranded foods instituted during recent years
have involved adulteration clearly resulting from unsanitary conditions and
other causes during storage after interstate shipment. Many other cases were
such that it would have been impossible to prove that contamination or
deterioration occurred before transportation ended. Even where that fact
could have been established through investigations, the time required to
make them frequently would have been such that unfit material would have
reached the consuming public.31
Further, this same report comments upon a serious enforcement problem in the
1938 law:
Many articles which actually were offensive at the time they were in-
troduced into interstate commerce will escape seizure because of the im-
possibility of obtaining proof prior to distribution to customers to show
that the condition did not develop after interstate transportation. Scien-
tific methods have not advanced to the point where they will show in-
fallibly when a particular product became debased ....
The practical reasons for the assertion by Congress of its power to the
extent recommended by the committee become apparent in viewing the prob-
lems of enforcement. More than 25 billions of dollars' worth of these com-
modities annually flows through the channels of interstate commerce. The
Food and Drug Administration has approximately 200 food and drug
inspectors on its rolls. The opportunity for inspection while the goods
are in transit is quite inadequate. It is inevitable - at least in the absence
of an increase in inspection personnel beyond anything that might be con-
sidered practicable - that the bulk of Federal inspection activities takes
place after merchandise has been transported in interstate commerce and
while it is stored pending further processing or disposition to consumers.8 2
28 Dunn, House of Representatives Bill 4071, 2 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.Q. 284, 290 (1947).
Weight is lent to his argument by the fact that the Supreme Court in the Sullivan case, supra
note 27, at 698, cites the Olsen decision to support the validity of the Act's criminal section
301 (k).
29 157 F.2d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1946) :
Whether Congress could have provided in § 304 (a) of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act... for the condemnation of any article of food that
is adulterated while held in original packages after being transported in in-
terstate commerce need not be considered, since Congress did not, in fact, so
provide.
30 62 Stat. 582 (1948).
31 Senate Report No. 1221, U.S. CODE CONG. SERzIC, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2120
(1948).
32 Id. at 2121.
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
The amendment sought to clarify the phrase, "when introduced into or while
in interstate commerce," by inserting immediately after those words the follow-
ing: "or while held for sale (whether or not the first sale) after shipment in inter-
state commerce." These added words, minus the parenthetical phrase, are identical
to those appearing in the 1938 criminal section 301 (k) 33 of the Act. Moreover,
the Miller Amendment effects changes in this latter section 8 ' to make it coexten-
sive with the new language of section 304 (a), by including acts which result in
adulteration as well' as misbranding. Further, it adds the parenthetical phrase,
"(whether or not the first sale)," making express what had previously been left
to implication.35
The Miller Amendment was approved and signed into law by the President
on June 24, 1948.36 Earlier that same year, the Sullivan37 case was decided under
the yet-to-be amended section 301 (k). In that criminal proceeding, a retail drug-
gist in Columbus, Georgia had purchased sulfathiozole tablets from a distributor
in Atlanta, Georgia who had in turn received them from Chicago, Illinois. It was
suspected that he had been selling this drug without a prescription to men stationed
at nearby Fort Berming for treatment of venereal disease. Investigators moved in
and on two separate occasions found that the druggist removed tablets from their
properly labeled bulk container in which they had been transported in inter-
state commerce and in which they were than being held for resale. He then placed
them in a pill box, labeled simply "sulfathiozole" and not containing the statutory
required directions for use or warnings of danger, and sold them locally to cus-
tomers. The Court held that Sullivan's conduct fell within the language of section
301 (k) and that a literal interpretation of this section was consistent with the
general purpose of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. "Its purpose was to
safeguard the consumer by applying the Act to articles from the moment of their
delivery to the ultimate consumer."381 In the concluding paragraph of the majority
opinion, Justice Black quickly disposed of the constitutional objection to the above
interpretation by relying primarily on McDermott v. Wisconsin,30 a 1913 decision
which upheld the constitutional power of Congress to regulate the branding of
articles that have completed their interstate journey and are being held for local
sale. He then offered a brief barrage of recent cases as auxiliary support.
40
Since the Miller Amendment made sections 304 (a) and 301 (k) coexten-
sive, the Sullivan opinion is often4" cited in support of section 304 (a)'s constitu-
tional validity.
IV. The Expanding Interpretation of Section 304 (a) of the Miller Amendment
Although the Miller Amendment was precipitated by the Phelps-Dodge deci-
sion, it went much further than" merely filling this breach in the administration of
33 Section 301 (k), 52 Stat. 1042 (1938).
34 Section 301 (k) as amended, 62 Stat. 582 (1948), 21 U.S.C. § 331 (k) (1958)prohibits: The adulteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the
whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with
respect to, a food, drug, device or cosmetic, if such act is done while such
article is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) after shipment in inter-
state commerce and results in such article being adulterated or misbranded.
(Emphasis added to indicate the amended portions.)
35 Senate Report No. 1221, U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE, supra note 31, p. 2121.
36 94 CONG. REc. 9366 (1948).
37 United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948). See Recent Decision, 23 NoTm
DAME LAWYER 392 (1948).
38 United States v. Sullivan, supra note 37, at 696.
39 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
40 .United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432 (1947); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111(1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Olsen, 161 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1947).
41 E.g., United States v. 4 Devices, Labeled in Part "Color-Therm," 176 F.2d 652 (10th
Cir. 1949).
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the Act. It is to be observed that a proscribed article remains under the ambit
of the 1948 section 304 (a), despite the number of sales that occur in intrastate
commerce. As long as the interstate origin of the article can be traced in its travels
of sale and resale within a state, it appears that the Government may extend its
reach over that article.
The tremendous authority intended to be granted to the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration is made evident by the following inquiry during a hearing before a
subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:
Mr. Hale. Under this language as drawn there is no limitation at all
as to Federal jurisdiction until the goods reach the ultimate purchaser,
is there?
Mr. Crawford. That is right, and that was on the assumption that
the happening of evil things to these goods which originate in interstate
commerce reacts unfavorably upon the interstate demand for those goods.42
Mr. Crawford, later in this same interrogation, added:
Congress unquestionably has the authority to maintain these goods
in a state of lily-white purity up to the time the interstate vehicle stops
rolling; but if that is all the authority Congress has it may be futile to ex-
ercise that authority because it cannot protect the consequences of the
regulation by preventing the evil things happening to the goods after
the interstate journey has ended. It seems to us to be a kind of negation
of the beneficent effect of that authority while interstate transportation is
in course, to say that nothing could be done to carry out the purpose of
Congress and to bring it to fruition, the purpose being the protection of
the ultimate consumer of goods from interstate sources.43
Before examining the case history subsequent to the Miller Amendment, a
moment should be taken to pick up an early thread in the pattern of expanding
interpretation. In October of 1948, the Supreme Court declared that the separate
shipment of machines and leaflets did not prevent the machines, when the leaflets,
containing false and misleading statements, were attached thereto, from being sub-
ject to condemnation under the 1938 version of section 304 (a)."4 This reversed
the decision of the court below.45 It appears that the Court, well aware of the
scope of the 1948-designed section 304 (a), offered a liberal interpretation of the
former language to maintain consistency.
This same question, under the new section, was given further study in United
States v. 4 Devices, Labeled in Part "Color-Therm"46 and Lee v. United States.47
In the former case, one Lee was a district salesman in Oklahoma of therapeutic
devices, which had been shipped to him from a Dr. Gerkey of Mission, Kansas.
The device itself was a wooden cabinet, with various tubes on the top and elec-
trical connections needed to operate it. When a person, seeking relief through the
machine, properly positioned his bare feet on the cabinet tubes and elevated his
head to the right level, he could see neon lights flashing in pinball machine-like
fashion, as he massaged with the applicator. Copies of instructions concerning the
device were typed in Oklahoma from a master circular furnished to Lee by the
Kansas doctor. These papers contained false and misleading statements as to the
efficacy of the device. Consequently, it was here that the Government had to find
a nexus to establish misbranding of the machine. Section 201 (in) of the statute
stated clearly: "The term 'labeling' means all labels and other written, printed, or
graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2)
accompanying such article." 48 But the instructions neither accompanied the devices
in interstate commerce from Kansas nor were they affixed to the devices while in
42 Hearing on H.R. 3128 and H.R. 3147, supra note 17, at 19.
43 Ibid.
44 United States v. Urbeteit, 335 U.S. 355 (1948).
45 Urbeteit v. United States, 164 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1947).
46 176 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1949).
47 187 F.2d 1005 (10th Cir. 1951).
48 Section 201 (in), 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (m) (1958).
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Lee's pdssession. The evidence simply showed that when Lee made a sale, he would
fold Ja copy of the instructions under the tubes before delivery to the customer.
Nevertheless, the court found that "textual" rather than physical attachment was
significant; it was sufficient that the instructions supplemented or explained the
devices. With little ado it was then declared: "The devices were misbranded while
held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce." 49 The same court further
expanded its view in the Lee case (after Color-Therm was remanded and the dis-
trict court sustained a motion by the United States for summary judgment, this
appeal was prosecuted) by finding that the article "is subject to seizure at any
time, the fact that at the time of seizure the false label is not upon the device or
does not accompany the device does not purge the device of its prior false labeling
or render it immune from seizure and condemnation."5 °
The case of United States v. Allbrook Freezing & Cold Storage,51 decided in
1952, bears a strong similarity to the Pinocchio case. Here, though, the articles in
question, raw strawberries, were alleged to be adulterated before interstate ship-
ment and later processed and packaged in this condition. But, the point to grasp
is that the court refused to recognize that processing and packaging of the straw-
berries created a new product "which .cannot be seized unless and until it moves
in interstate commerce in its changed form. If this were a sound view, and adul-
terated constituents of processed products could be seized only when in their un-
processed form, the enforcement of the act would be easily defeated."' 2 Seizure
was not premature; it was enough that the ingredients of raw strawberries were
adulterated while in interstate commerce.
The devastation of the 1951 Missouri flood produced an interesting food and
drug case,53 the concern of which was the meaning of "while held for sale." Claimant
to the insuing libel action was the owner of a large quantity of distilled spirits
which was stored and held for sale in the Last Chance Tavern and Shawnee Club.
At the advance of the rising waters, the tavern and club were closed; and while
closed they were engulfed by the deluge, which covered the stored bottles with
filth and mutilated their labels. Several days after the waters had subsided, claimant
washed the bottles and removed them to two residences in Kansas City, Missouri,
where they were later seized. The issue presented was whether the intoxicating
beverages were adulterated and misbranded by the flood waters while "held for
sale" and therefore subject to forfeiture under section 304 (a), inasmuch as the
imminence of the flood forced a closing of the tavern and club. The district court
found that there was no contention by the claimant that he intended to cease
business or abandon the goods in question. Therefore,
the only conclusion to be reached is that from the time the floodwaters
descended until the liquor was removed from the above premises they be-
came and were adulterated and misbranded within the meaning of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act . . . , while being "held for sale."
The removal of such liquor from the premises where it was so held, after
its adulteration and misbranding, did not withdraw such liquor from the
ambit of the Act.54
It is not the holding for sale after adulteration but the adulteration or misbranding
of the article "while held for sale (whether or not the first sale)" after interstate
transportation that. subjects the goods to immediate forfeiture.
A few years later a United States district court in Pennsylvania 55 concerned
itself with this same problem of when an article is held for sale, and it cited United
49 United States v. Color-Therm, 176 F.2d 652, 654 (10th Cir. 1949).
50 Lee v. United States, 187 F.2d 1005, 1007 (10th Cir. 1951).
51 194 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1952).
52 Id. at 939.
53 United States v. 1,800.2625 Wine Gallons of Distilled Spirits, 121 F.Supp. 735 (W.D.
Mo. 1954).
54 Id. at 738.
55 United States v. 10 Cartons, Labeled in Part "Hoxsey," 152 F.Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa.
1957).
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States v. 1,800.2625 Wine Gallon 56 as controlling. The Food and Drug Agency
had charged that the pills dispensed by the Hoxsey Cancer Clinic in Portage,
Pennsylvania were misbranded by leaflets and printed matter which explained the
drug's usefulness. The medications, located in the drug and sterilization rooms, were
seized while in their original containers from which they were eventually to be
transferred to small envelopes for distribution to patients. At the same time, the
literature in question, found in the entrance hall of the clinic, was seized. The court
determined that where printed or graphic matter is used in the distribution or
sale of the drug to explain its use and effectiveness, it may be considered labeling
within the Act, even though there is a separation between the article and the print-
ing.57 But the claimants urged that the drugs were not intended for sale in the
statutory sense, but for prescription by physicians in pursuit of a local practice of
medicine. The argument was lost upon the court:
It may be that physicians are not understood as holding for sale the drugs
which they may administer or prescribe in connection with their treatment
of patients. But potentiality of harm to the public from misbranded drugs
is not less because the intervening agency of distribution may be a physician
rather than a layman- The terms "while held for sale" have been given
an expansive rather 'than a technical construction. . . . It is not the
holding for sale in a technical sense which gives rise to the federal jurisdic-
tion in cases arising under § 304 (a) but the fact that the channels of
commerce have been used.58
The above selection of cases manifests a persistent forward push by the Food
and Drug Administration. The Act has been extended to an ever greater control
of goods which have been shipped in interstate commerce, but which at the time
of the government's seizure have ended their trans-states travel. However, there
are limits to how far the Government may reach into a state in order to keep its
finger on the articles which have their origin from without that state. This line
was sharply drawn in the Phelps-Dodge decision under the 1939 version of section
304 (a). The same reluctance was demonstrated under the amended section in
United States v. An Article or Device Consisting of 31 Units (Gonsertron),59 a
1959 case over which Chief Judge Levin presided. The federal district court, in
an almost matter-of-fact opinion, refused to allow libel against a device, 0 con-
structed entirely within the state of Michigan, partly from nine components which
were received from various other states, where the device was neither sold nor held
for sale outside the state. These components were ordinary electrical fixtures "in
56 121 F.Supp. 735 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
57 United States v. Urbeteit, 335 U.S. 355 (1948) waS cited in support of this position.
58 United States v. 10 Cartons, Labeled in Part "Hoxsey," 152 F.Supp. 360, 364-365
(W.D. Pa. 1957).
59 180 F.Supp. 52 (E.D. Mich. 1959).
60 Section 201 (h), 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (h) (1958) states:
The term "device" (except when used in paragraph (n) of this section
and in sections 301 (i), 403 (f), 502 (c), and 602 (c) of this title) means
instruments, apparatus, and contrivances, including their components, parts,
and accessories, intended (1) for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; or (2) to affect the
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.
Compare the above to the parts (2) and (3) of the definition of "drug" which is the subject
matter of the case immediately following Gonsertron in the text. Section 201 (g), 52 Stat.
1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (g) (1958) states:
The term "drug" means (1) articles recognized in the official United
States Pharmacopoeia, official Homceopathic Pharmacopceia of the United
States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them;
and (2) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (3) articles
(other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body of man or other animals; and (4) articles intended for uses as a com-
ponent of any article specified in clause (1), (2), or (3) of this paragraph;
ut does not include devices or their components, parts, or accessories.
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common use in industry. None of them were made to the specifications of the manu-
facturer of the device." 61
However, in March, 1961, the United States v. An Article of Drug Consisting
of 39 Cases (Korleen)62 case arose on this same point before the same judicial
representative of the United States. Here, the Government alleged a misbranding
of drug tablets under section 304 (a). Judge Levin held that tablets which were
composed of drugs shipped in interstate commerce were subject to the Act, although
they were manufactured in Michigan for distribution there. In contrast to Gon-
sertron, "in the case at bar, the 'drugs' comprising the Korleen Tablets are the
very heart of the manufactured and tableted 'drug' and were proclaimed as such
to the public."6' 3 The advertisements laid stress on the alleged therapeutic value
of the active ingredients of Korleen Tablets. Further, the court declared:
It would be a strained interpretation to say that each "drug" component
falls within the jurisdiction of the Act, being shipped in interstate com-
merce, but, when compounded together to form another "drug," 'the
finished product is not being held for sale after shipment in interstate
commerce.
64
It appears that the Food and Drug Administration has carefully chosen fact
situations from which its attorneys can fashion fuller federal control of food, drugs
and cosmetics, under the banner of protecting the public health and purse. One
of the latest of these chosen cases has yet to be examined.
V. United States v. 40 Cases, More or Less, of Pinocchio Brand Oil65
It will be recalled that here the government brought a libel action against
a food66 product, known as "Pinocchio" oil, which had been manufactured and
misbranded in New York State from components received by interstate shipment.
Although the blended oil product was not held for sale outside of New York, the
Food and Drug Administration pressed its case on the ground that all of the com-
ponents had been shipped in interstate commerce and that the sum of these separate
components was misbranded after their shipment and while held for sale in their
blended form.
When a federal district court ruled that this constituted "a new product or
complete article of intrastate manufacture ' 67 which was beyond the reach of sec-
tion 304 (a), the Government quickly sought an appeal. The Wall Street Journal
noted that the administration feared this decision, "if upheld, would significantly
curb [its] power to seize misbranded foods."'68 The news article further stated:
Agency lawyers regard the new ruling as a "test case" of the agency'sjurisdiction over the misbranding of similar foods. This type of violation
makes up 3% to 5% of the agency's 100 to 150 monthly enforcement cases.
If the District Court is upheld, an agency spokesman said a "significant
number" of cases will be removed from the agency's reach. The Supreme
Court never has interpreted the scope of the agency's power under the 1948
amendment.69
On appeal before the Second Circuit, appellee, A. M. S. Packing Company,
contended that "the libel alleges that Pinocchio the product manufactured in New
York was misbranded and adulterated; not the original oils (ingredients) received
from out of state."' 70 In addition it was stated that the product was first created
61 United States v. Gonsertron, 180 F.Supp. 52, 53 (E.D. Mich. 1959).
62 192 F.Supp. 51 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
63 Id. at 52.
64 Ibid.
65 289 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1961); cert. denied, 30 U.S.L. WEEx 3113 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1961).
66 Section 201 (f), 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (f) (1958) states: "The term
'food' means (1) articles used for food or drink for man or other animals, (2) chewing gum,
and (3) articles used for components of any such article."
67 188 F.Supp. 290, 291 (N.D. N.Y. 1960).
68 The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 25, 1960, p. 3, col. 4.
69 Ibid.
70 Brief for Appellee, p. 8.
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in New York and never left that jurisdiction. 1 Appellant attacked both this con-
tention and the holding below that Pinocchio was a "new product":
The article is "new" only in the sense that the interstate components
have been blended together, a mixture almost wholly vegetable oil sub-
stituted for a blend containing a substantial amount of olive oil, and a false
label affixed. The very same interstate oils are in the cans, and the Gov-
ernment is attempting to bring to bear the Congressional protection against
their sale to the consumer in their now adulterated and misbranded
form.7 2
The agency attorneys argued further:
As in Sullivan, articles were shipped legally in interstate commerce; mixed
together so as to alter their form as in Allbrook; and, subsequently, mais-
branded as in Color-Therm and Lee. In addition, in this case, the articles
were also adulterated. The important fact on which federal jurisdiction
rests is that the components of the misbranded and adulterated oil had once
moved irxterstate. A. M. S. as the consignee received the advantages of
federal regulation which assured it honest labeling and unadulterated
components. It now would deny the same protection to the ultimate
consumer on the technicality that the honestly labeled oils it received have
been mixed together.7 3
The force of these arguments obviously left their mark on the mind of the
court. It declared that the completed mixture which was being held for sale as
"oil" was "the very same type of food which had traveled across the state line."7 4
Judge Lumbard easily distinguished the Gonsertron case with the aid of the Korleen
limitation. Yet he reasoned with strain that it was the end result of the labor ex-
pended in assembling the component parts which was misreprewented. However,
in the case before him, the "misbranding related directly to the percentage content
of the olive oil shipped in intersate commerce."' 75 It is in this no doubt subtle dis-
tinction that the essence of the opinion lies. This is a point which will again be
examined in appraising the scope of the decision.
A. M. S. Packing Company petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. This
was denied in October, 1961.76 The petition, however, offered the Government an
opportunity to sharpen its argument. In its brief in opposition to certiorari, the
policy issue is brought into clear focus:
If the petitioners are right in their contention that misbranding or
adulteration of food "while held for sale * * * after shipment in interstate
comnierce" can be removed from the reach of the Act by any change, how-
ever slight, in the form of the product, there would be a significant loop-
hole for evasion. For example, many misbranders and adulterators of food
and drugs that move in interstate commerce could get around the Act simply
by "decentralizing" certain phases of their operations. A nationwide operator
who, before the 1948 amendment, could get away with mixing or processing
his product at one central location and then shipping it interstate for mis-
branding or adulteration in the state of sale, could now escape the effect
of the amendment by varying his operation solely to the extent of doing
the mixing or processing at the same place he does the misbranding or
adulteration. And if the simple mixing involved in the instant case is a suf-
ficient "change in form" to achieve this result, presumably almost anything,
such as addition of a coloring agent, would do. It is not reasonable to
suppose that Congress intended to permit such artificial distinctions to
defeat its purpose.77
71 Id. pp. 4-5:
Pinocchio was created in this state and moved solely intrastate. The
wrong, if any, occurred in connection with such newly manufactured article
by reason of acts committed wholly within the State of New York, and
hence this transaction falls within the orbit of intrastate - not interstate
commerce, and the libel was wrongfully filed.
72 Brief for Appellant, pp. 7-8.
73 Id. p. 13.
74 United States v. Pinocchio, 289 F.2d 343, 345 (2d Cir. 1961).
75 Id., at 346.
76 30 U.S.L. WEK 3113 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1961).
77 Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp. 9-10.
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VI. The Law of Gonsertron, Korleen and Pinocchio
The Pinocchio case and its two immediate predecessors, Gonsertron and Kor
leon, represent the law of what constitutes the necessary interstate ingredient for
the Federal Food and Drug Law to attach to an article which has received a new
form after it has come to rest within a state. The Gonsertron decision makes it diffi-
cult to harmonize the three cases. Both the court'of Korleen and that of Pinocchio
recognize this dissonance, in drawing distinctions to the Gonsertron fact situation. 7
These have been examined. Yet, some difficulty with these distinctions may still
persist.
One is inclined to wonder why the Government ever initiated the Gonsertron
case. The libel was tersely dismissed in the United States District Court of Mich-
igan's Eastern Division; there was no appeal. Mr. William W. Goodrich, Assistant
General Counsel of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Food and
Drug Division, answers: "The case came to us because this worthless device was
being used locally in the treatment of serious diseases and could not be controlled
by the state medical authorities. We thought we had a good case. We recommended
an appeal. The Solicitor General declined."7 9
Probably, the most lucid distinction between the Pinocchio and Gonsertron
decisions was set forth in the Government's brief in opposition to petition for
certiorari:
Petitioners' reliance upon [Gonsertron] is misplaced. There the com-
ponents that had been shipped interstate were ordinary electrical fixtures,
shipped with no intention that they be used in assembling a therapeutic
device. They were purchased on the open market by the claimant, who
originated the idea that the assembled machine had a therapeutic and
diagnostic merit. Thus, unlike the situation here where all the component
oils had been received in interstate commerce, no "device" - defined
by the Act as an article intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease (21 U.S.C. 321 (h)) - had moved
interstate.80
This, Mr. Goodrich indicates in his letter, was the point the Solicitor General's
office stressed in declining appeal to the district court's determination in Gonsertron.
"They considered the record inadequate to show that the components met the
statutory definition of 'device' when they were in interstate commerce or at any
time prior to their purchase on the open market in Michigan and their assembly
into a therapeutic device.""' However, in Korleen and Pinocchio, it is to be noted
that the drug components and oils which went into their respective blends were
already drug and food when they were transported in interstate commerce.
No distinction among the cases can be based on the number or percentage of
ingredients received from out of state as the criterion for determining whether the
completed article of food, drug or device was sold or held for sale after shipment
in interstate commerce. One will recall that only some of the components which
made up the Gonsertron device were of foreign origin, whereas in Korleen and
Pinocchio all the ingredients of the articles involved came from without the state.
78 It is interesting to note that Judge Levin in United States v. Korleen, 192 F.Supp. 51,
52 (E.D. Mich. 1961) distinguished the situation before him from both the district-court's
decision of Pinocchio as well as the Gonsertron decision:
In both cases, the Courts held that an article or device is not subject to
the jurisdiction of the Act where only components shipped in interstate com-
merce were either a minor ingredient of the final product or several common-
ly used components which lost their identity within the newly manufactured
device.
The Korleen case was decided in March, while the appellate court's decision of Pinocchio was
not issued until April, 1961.
79 Letter of Nov. 29, 1961, from William W. Goodrich, Assistant General Counsel of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Food and Drug Division, on file at Notre Dame
Law Library.
80 Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 8.
81 Letter of Nov. 29, 1961, from William W. Goodrich, supra note 78.
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Particular significance is not attached to this. Neither court in the latter decisions
made an argument of it, although each distinguished the case before it from Gon-
sertron.
Perhaps the point to grasp is the degree of change which takes place in the
articles from their condition "while in interstate commerce." Must the components
remain basically the same, differing only in form; or must the intrastate product
be primarily composed of the ingredients which have been shipped interstate? Mr.
Goodrich is again informative:
When you ask how great a change must be made in the component,
I must answer that I do not consider that the critical problem, although
it was quite significant in the Pinocchio and Korleen cases. Assume that
there was shipped in interstate commerce a food additive which is per-
mitted for use in potato chips at a level of 50 ppm. This tolerance has
been established to assure the safe use of the additive. If we found potato
chips, prepared locally, with the food additive of interstate distribution pres-
ent at a level higher than the established tolerance, we would attempt to
enforce the tolerance and to condemn the potato chips in the interest of
protecting the public health. 8 2
What then are the limits of federal jurisdiction? The petition for a writ of
certiorari in the Pinocchio case points up this problem:
If the present attempt at power by the Food & Drug is upheld it means
that the Act will affect every food product manufactured locally from whole-
some ingredients obtained from out of state - even though the manufac-
tured product is sold intrastate - a revolutionary concept in the enforce-
ment of the law and recasting with strange meaning the definition of inter-
state commerce and the term "while held for sale after shipment in inter-
state commerce." 83
The petitioner appears to be indulging in invective. The Supreme Court answered
just such a contention in the Sullivan decision, when it said:
The scope of the offense which Congress defined is not to be judi-
cially narrowed as applied to drugs by envisioning extreme possible applica-
tions of its different misbranding provisions which relate to food, cosmetics,
and the like. There will be opportunity enough to consider such con-
tingencies should they ever arise.8 4
Each case must be judged on its merits. The author does not presume to draw the
line. "An accurate, all-inclusive definition of interstate commerce has never been
formulated by the courts. . . . [I]ts facets are far too numerous and diverse."8
5
VII. Conclusion
The difficulty in interpreting the commerce clause, as the basis for federal
jurisdiction, is often one of determining whether local goods or transactions have
a sufficient effect on interstate commerce.8 6 However, recent interpretation of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act's section 304 (a) has given consideration
to the other side of the coin. Gonsertron, Korleen and Pinocchio all face the ques-
tion of how far into interstate commerce the Food and Drug Administration can
reach after interstate transportation has come to a halt. No doubt the best insight
to the problem lies in the words of the Assistant General Counsel of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare: "To my mind the problem is whether the mis-
use or misbranding of the interstate component has some consumer significance in
the end product. If it does, we would try to apply the statute to it."87 The Govern-
ment will seek to extend its jurisdiction as far as possible. Moreover, the Gonsertron
limitation cannot be generalized. The same judge who decided that case, narrowly
limited it to its facts in the subsequent Korleen decision.
82 Ibid.
83 Petition for a Writ of 'Certiorari, pp. 7-8.
84 United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 694 (1948).
85 United States v. Sanders, 99 F.Supp. 113, 115 (W.D. Okl. 1951).
86 E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
87 Letter of Nov. 29, 1961, from William W. Goodrich, supra note 78.
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The scope of section 304 (a) appears in the words of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals: "Congress surely intended the provisions of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act to apply to foods processed within a state, after shipment in
interstate commerce, as was the case here. The statute must be read and applied
broadly in order to effectuate its remedial purpose."8 8
Norman E. Matteoni*
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION - DEFAMATION - REQunRtE SEPARATION RE-
PORTS AND LIAmITy BASED UPON DEFAMATORY MATTER CONTAINED THEREIN -
Every state at present has unemployment compensation or employment security
statutes. These statutes provide for periodic payments to unemployed workers
based on credits accumulated while gainfully employed. An almost universal re-
quirement demands that upon cessation of employment an employer submit, to
the state, employment security commission reasons for such discontinuance. This
requirement serves a twofold purpose: it qualifies or disqualifies an unemployed
worker for or from benefits and determines an employer's net cost. Under the
acts, employing units are required to contribute to these funds in accordance with
their unemployment costs as shown by experience. A unit which has little unem-
ployment, i.e., voluntary dismissals, is entitled to a reduced rate. Under these
statutes, an employee who is fired for cause is disqualified from receiving benefits
for a certain length of time, e.g., four to nine weeks in Iowa." Thus, in order to
keep his rate of contribution at a low level, it is in the interest of an employer to
see to it that an employee, who has been fired for cause, does not recover benefits
and is not classified as one voluntarily dismissed.
The commissions which have been created to administer the acts provide
forms for the employer to indicate whether an employee has been involuntarily
discharged. The majority of states require an employer to file a separation report,
either soon after the dismissal or after a request by the commissioner, and some
states impose harsh penalties for a wilful failure to file. The Arkansas provision
for a fine of $20-$200 and/or a sixty day imprisonment is a common sanction aid-
ing enforcement.2 All states which require reports hold that a failure to file repre-
sents an admission of the employee's claim and status.
As stated, the vast majority of the states require a separation report setting
forth the reasons for the discharge. The few states which do not require reports
do make some provision for an appeal of the commissioner's determination, if an
employer is dissatisfied with the result. Thus, by virtue of the charges made at
such times, the question of libel may arise in some manner in all of the states.
"Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed
words, by its embodiment in physical form, or by any other form of communica-
tion which has the potentially harmful characteristic of written or printed words. ' 3
Formerly, liability was imposed on all libelous, i.e., written, statements. Gradually,
however, the tort of defamation encompassed both libel and slander, with the result
that libel was "treated like slander, which is to say that except for certain categories
of imputation, [i.e., crime, unchastity, lack of business, trade, or professional ability]
it is not actionable without proof of special damages."4 Consequently, by disclosing
his reason for a discharge, which often includes a charge of stealing or dishonesty,
an employer may well subject himself to a suit for damages.
A party is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter in certain in-
88 United States v. Pinocchio, 289 F.2d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 1961).
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to John B. Buckley, Associate Legal Coun-
sel, Miles Laboratories, Inc., Elkhart, Ind., for his time and assistance in this subject matter.
1 IowA CODE ANN. § 96.5(2) (Supp. 1960).
2 ARx. STAT. ANN. § 81-1119(b) (1960).
3 R ESTATEMENT, TORTS § 568(1) (1938).
4 PROSSER, TORTS 588 (2d ed. 1955).
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stances, e.g., in judicial proceedings.3 Also, the law recognizes a qualified privilege
i areas-where ''the interest the defendant is seeking to vindicate is regarded as
having an intermediate degree of importance, so that the immunity conferred is.
not absolute, -but is conditioned, upon publication in a reasonable manner and for
a proper purpose."' , Since an accusation that one is a thief, or is dishonest, is
libelous per se, a qualified privilege which may be destroyed at the whim of the
jury is of little aid and comfort to an employer. The absence of an absolute privilege
has a tendency to thwart the full and honest disclosure envisaged in the require-
ment of separation reports upon termination of employment. Many states have
provided for this absolute privilege in their Employment Security legislation.
States Providing an Absolute Privilege
Nineteen states have given recognition to the problem by passing legislation
providing employing units with an absolute privilege in their disclosures tc the
Unemployment Compensation Commission.7 A typical statute conferring immunity
is represented by the Florida provision, which states that:
All letters, reports, communications, or any other matters, either oral
or written, from the employer or the employee to each other or to the
commission or any of its agents, representatives or employees which shall
have been written, sent, or delivered, or made in connection with the
requirements and administration of this chapter, shall be absolutely privi-
leged and shall not be made the subject matter or basis for any suit for
slander or libel in any court of the state of Florida.8
Three of the jurisdictions, California, New York, and Oregon, do not follow
the general form but achieve the same result by holding information required by
the Unemployment Compensation Commission to be inadmissible in evidence in
any court action or proceeding. For instance, Section 537 of the New York Labor
Law provides:
Information acquired from employers or employees pursuant to this
article shall be for the exclusive use and information of the commissioner
in the discharge of his duties hereunder and shall not be open to the public
nor be used in any court in any action or proceeding pending therein unless
the commissioner is a party to such action or proceeding, notwithstanding
any other provisions of law.9
The question of liability for defamation in required reports under the Unem-
ployment Compensation Act has had an interesting history in New York. Although
the Court of Appeals has not yet been presented with an occasion to rule on the
question, the cases which have dealt with this issue have concluded that an employer
is immune from suit for libel.
In the first New York case on this subject, Andrews v. Cacchio °0 an action
for personal injuries, where a defendant sought to subpoena the records of the
Division of Employment in order to determine whether the plaintiff had received
unemployment insurance benefits and whether the plaintiff had made certain
representations in connection with her physical condition during the period when
she claimed to have been disabled as a result of the injuries sustained, the court
5 Id. at 607.
6 Id. at 614.
7 Azr. CODE tit. 26, § 233 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.16(3) (1952); GA. CODE
ANN. § 54-642.1 (1961); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 341.190(3) (1955); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
ch. 29, § 29 (1954); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151A, § 46 (1957); MicH. STAT. ANN. §
17.511(b) (1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.12(12) (1959); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 288.250(1952); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 282:9(m)(2) (Supp. 1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
96-4(g) (1) (1958); N.D. CODE ANN. § 52-06-37 (1960); OHIO RE v. CODE ANN. § 4141.21(1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 221(1) (1954); S.C. CODE § 68-27 (1952); S.D.
CODE § 17.0814 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1339 (Supp. 1961); TEx. Rv. Crv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-9(h) (Supp. 1960); W.Va, CODE ANN. § 2366(154) (1955).
8 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.16(3) (1952).
9 N.Y. LAB. LAWS § 537.
10 264 App. Div. 791, 35 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1942).
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reversed the order directing that the records be produced at the trial, It reasbned
that the applicable section of the Unemployment Insurance section of the Labor.
Law prohibited the use of such records. :
Simpson v. Oil Transfer Corporation".1 indicates that the-same rule applies to
proceedings in the federal courts. This was an action for libel removed from
the Supreme Court of the State of New York to the. United States District Court
for the.Northern District of New York upon a finding of diversity of citizenship.
The commissioner, in order to ascertain whether or not to award unemployment
insurance benefits, requested certain information from the applicant's former
employer. The latter, under compulsion of the applicable statute and regulations,
complied with the request. The plaintiff contended that certain of the statements
contained in the defendant's reply were false and malicious. The court, relying
on Andrews v. Cacchio, dismissed the complaint. It determined that:
It is apparent that the writings of the defendant referred to in the
complaint were pertinent and relevant to a determination by the com-
missioner of the plaintiff's right to unemployment benefits, and as such,
they were privileged under the laws of the State of New York, and may
not be used in any court therein. It follows that an action based thereon
must be dismissed.12
Coyne v. O'Connor'3 involved an employer's letter to the Industrial Com-
mission setting forth the reasons for an employee's discharge, made in connection
with an application for unemployment benefits for a discharged employee. The
court reasoned that the letter was confidential and privileged and that the plaintiff
was not entitled to maintain a suit for libel. It stated:
No New York case has heretofore considered what effect a statute
such as Sec. 537 of the Labor Law should have on the doctrine of absolute
privilege. That section does not in terms deal with "privilege" absolute or
otherwise, but it does provide for a positive non-disclosure of the com-
munication complained of here, in court or out of court. I deem this to
show a legislative intent to remove defendant's letter from the realm of
actionable libel. This may be equivalent to saying that it is absolutely
privileged. More accurately it could be termed a statutory privilege, since
the confidential nature of these records distinguish this case from the
common-law variety of absolute privilege which is confined to a public
trial in a judicial proceeding, statements made in the legislature, and
similar situations.' 4
Also, in Breuer v. Bo-Craft Enterprises,'5 an analogous case, the court decided
that, in view of the employer's duty to furnish reasons in a separation report in
response to an inquiry from the State Department of Labor, Division of Employ-
ment, and in view of the statute making such communications confidential, an
employer's report could not be used by the employee as a basis for a libel action
against the employer. The court concluded:
It appears to this Court that the Legislature in its wisdom has weighed
the benefits to the greater number by providing for confidential communica-
tions as against the damage that might be done to an individual by a
malicious response to a Department inquiry and had decided in favor of
the greater benefits to the greater number. Any other interpretation could
well emasculate the Labor Law.16
Two recent decisions protecting an employer with a privilege in libel have
relied on this line of authority.1 "
11 75 F. Supp. 819 (N.D.N.Y. 1948).
12 Id. at 822.
13 204 Misc. 465, 121 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
14 Id. at 101-02.
15 8 Misc. 2d 736, 170 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
16 Id. at 633.
17 Mandell v. Terminal Beauty Shops, Inc., 23 Misc.2d 205, 201 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup.
Ct. 1960), held that an employer's letter, stating that the cause of the plaintiff's dismissal
was because she was a "trouble maker," was a privileged communication. Graham v. Sea-
way Radio, Inc., 28 Misc. 2d 706, 216 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1961), decided that an employer's
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The California statute also holds required information inadmissible as evi-
dence."' There is one case, decided in a lower court, which states that since an
employer must advise the state of the facts surrounding the termination of an
employee's services, an employer's communication to the state is absolutely priv-
ileged.
1 9
Oregon's provision is comparable to that of New York and California.20
There have been no cases reported dealing with absolute privilege in this area.
Yet in Moore v. Sater,21 where an attorney accused his neighbors, who protested
his appointment as guardian of a client, of libelous remarks made in the pleadings,
the Oregon Supreme Court held that the statements, because published in a judicial
proceeding, were absolutely privileged. The court discussed this doctrine and
adopted what it considered to be the general rule, namely, that "The class of
absolutely privileged communications is narrow and is practically limited to
legislative and judicial proceedings and other acts of state, including it is said,
communications made in the discharge of a duty under express authority by law,
by or to heads of executive departments of the state and matters involving military
affairs."
22
In Garcia v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc.,23 a federal district court decided
that defamatory matter communicated to the Labor Department under the law
in Puerto Rico was absolutely privileged as a communication made before a legisla-
tive or judicial proceeding.
Non-Statutory Indication of Absolute Privilege
There are a few states which, while not clothing separation reports with an
absolute privilege in their statutes or in their case law, have indicated that an
employer will be immune from suit. In White v. United Mills Co.,24 where an
employer stated to the Unemployment Compensation Commission the cause of
the employee's discharge to be "inefficiency and wilful disobedience in complying
with company regulations," a Missouri court decided that reports made to the
Commissioner of Labor under the Kansas statute, which classified the reports as
confidential, were quasi-judicial in nature and hence were absolutely privileged.
Although the Kansas courts have yet to deal with this question, the Commissioner
of Labor in Kansas has stated that although "this case was tried in a Missouri
court .. . it is printed in the Kansas section of the several services because the
alleged libel occurred in Kansas and the court applied the Kansas law rather than
the Missouri law. '"2 5
statement to the Unemployment Compensation Commission, that former employee was a
lazy man and one that would rather receive unemployment benefits than work, was privileged.
18 CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1094 (1956), which in part provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this division the information
furnished to the director by any employing unit, pursuant to this division,
shall be for the exclusive use and information of the director in the dis-
charge of his duties and shall not be open to the public, nor admissible in
evidence in any action or special proceeding, other than one arising out of
the provisions of this division.
19 Huber v. The San Francisco Bank (Super. Ct., San Francisco County, Nov. 4, 1953)
2 CCH UNEMP. INs. REP. Cal. 1670.19 (1961).
20 ORE. RyV. STAT. § 657.655(1)(b) (1959), provides that:
Information secured from employing units, employees or other individuals
pursuant to this chapter:
(b) Shall not be used in any court in any action or proceedings pending
therein unless the commissioner or the state is a party to such action
or proceedings.
21 215 Ore. 417, 335 P.2d 843 (1959).
22 Id. at 845.
23 97 F. Supp. 5 (D.P.R. 1951).
24 240 Mo. App. 443, 208 S.W.2d 803 (1948).
25 Letter From Harold L. Smith, Labor Commissioner, Kansas Employment Security
Division, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Nov. 29, 1961, on file in the Notre Dame Law Library.
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The New Mexico Employment. Security Commission has said that their act,
which considers *eparation reports as confidential,2 renders the reports privileged
and that "our courts, state and federal, do not require their production even upon
subpoena.)
27
While the above statements, obtained from the commissions, would not be
binding upon a court, they do demonstrate the apparent attitude in these two states.
States Providing a Qualified Privilege
Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, and Nebraska, while recognizing the problem
and enacting some type of legislation, have still not protected the employer, since
they grant only a qualified privilege which is overcome by proof of the existence
of malice or unreasonableness. 2 The Maryland statute provides:
No report, communication, or any other such matter either oral or
written from the employee or employer to each other or to the Executive
Director or Board of Appeals or any of their agents, representatives or
employees, which shall have been written, sent, delivered or made in con-
nection with the requirements and administration of this article shall be
made the subject matter or basis of any suit for slander or libel in any
court, unless such report, communication, or other such matter is false and
malicious.29
Since the circumstances surrounding an employee's discharge, if published, are
often deemed automatically malicious or libelous per se, a qualified privilege affords
no protection at all.
The problem is not as severe in Mississippi, where no separation reports are
required,30 as it is in the other three states. No cases have been reported in
Nebraska and Maryland. In Illinois, although the courts have stated that a person
is not subject to suit for slander or libel for defamatory statements in a paper filed
before a board or commission,3 ' and have prohibited the disclosure of information
obtained from any individual by the Labor Department,8 2 there has been no out-
right recognition of an absolute privilege in the face of the statute.
States Indicating That Reports Are Not Required
Although the legal counsel for the Unemployment Compensation Commissions
for the states of Montana and Washington have indicated that separation reports
are not required,3 3 the problem still exists, since an employer who is dissatisfied
with a commissioner's decision must appeal to prevent his account from being
charged accordingly.
26 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-9-11.11 (Supp. 1961).
27 Letter From A. M. Frazier, Commission Counsel, Employment Security Commission
of New Mexico, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Nov. 27, 1961, on file in the Notre Dame Law
Library.
28 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 640 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A,§ 12(g)(2) (1957); Mss. COD ANN. § 7412 (Supp. 1960); NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 48-612
(1943).
29 Mi,. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 12(g) (2) (1957). (Emphasis supplied.)
30 Letter From Floyd P. Smith, General Counsel of the Mississippi Employment Security
Commission, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Nov. 21, 1961, on file in the Notre Dame Law
Library.
31 Parker v. Kirkland, 298 Ill. App. 340, 18 N.E.2d 709 (1939), decided that counsel's
defamatory statements, made in a hearing on a capital stock assessment before the Board
of Appeals of Cook County, were absolutely privileged, since made in the course of a judicial
proceeding.
32 Smith v. Illinois Valley, 20 Ill. App.2d 312, 156 N.E.2d 361 (1959), held that a
person's statement, that he was able to work, made to an employee of the Department of Labor,
was inadmissible in view of a provision in the Unemployment Compensation Law prohibiting
disclosure of information obtained from any individual by the Department" of Labor.
33 Letter From Edward C. Schroeter, Attorney for the Montana Unemployment Com-
pensation Commission, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Nov. 21, 1961, on file in the Notre Dame
Law Library.
Letter From Paul J. Murphy, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Washington,
to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Nov. 25, 1961, on file in the Notre Dame Law Library.
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STATES NOT GRANTING AN ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE
Reports Penalty for Reports Made Qualified Indication that Employ.
State Required Failure to File Confidential Privilege er Will Be Protected
Alaska x If wilful, up to $200 ALASKA Comp. LAws ANN.
and 60 days. § 51-5-110 (Supp. 1958).
Arizona x $20-200 and/or Aasz. REV. STAT. ANN.
90 days. § 23-722 (1956).
Arkansas x If wilful, $20-200 and Ams. STAT. ANN.
/or 60 days. § 81-1114(1) (1960).
Colorado x $25 and barred from COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
protesting award of § 82-3-7 (1953).
benefits.
Connecticut x Up to $200 and six
months.
Delaware x If wilful, $20-200 and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
/or 60 days. § 3126 (1953).
District of x Up to $1000 and/or D.C. CODE ANN.
Columbia six months. § 46-313(f) (1961).
Hawaii x If wilful, $20-200 and HAWAII REv. LAWS
/or 60 days. § 93-94 (1955).
Idaho x If wilful, $20-200 and IDAHO CODE ANN. -
/or 60 days. § 72-1342 (Supp. 1961).
Illinois x Misdemeanor, $5-200 ILL. ANN. STAT. ILL. ANN. STAT.
and/or six months. ch. 48, § 640 (Smith-Hurd ch. 48, § 640 (Smith-
Supp. 1960). Hurd Supp. 1960).
Indiana x $5: IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 52-1544 (1951).
Iowa x If wilful, $20-200 and
/or 60 days.
Kansas x If wilful, $20-200 and KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Letter From Labor
/or 60 days. § 44-714(f) (Supp. 1959). Commissioner.*
Louisiana x If wilful, $20-200 and LA. Rsv. STAT.
/or 60 days. 23:1660 (1950).
Maryland x $2-10. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 95A, § 12(g)
(1957).
Mississippi MIss. CODE ANN. MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 7411 (Supp. 1960). § 7412 (Supp. 1960).
Montana MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
§ 87.124 (1947).
In Magelo v. Roundup Coal Mining Co., 4 the Montana Supreme Court held
that a letter, characterizing the employee as a malingerer and as one who had
presented fraudulent claims in the past, written by the employee's manager in
connection with the employee's claim for compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, was libelous and was not privileged as a publication made in
an official proceeding, since the statements made were not relevant and material
to the issue before the board.
In Washington, although there is an informal Attorney General's Opinion 5
34 109 Mont. 293, 96 P.2d 932 (1939).
35 OSs. ATT'y GEN. (1952), 9 CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. Wash. 1 1670.03 (1956).
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STATES NOT GRANTING AN ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE (Continued)
Penalty for
Failure to File
If wilful, $20-200 and Nr. R
/or 60 days. § 48-61
Reports
Required
x
x
Reports Made
Confidential
LEv. STAr.
2 (1943).
Nzv. Rzv. STAT.
612.625 (1955).
If wilful, $100 and/or N.M. STAT. ANN.
30 days. § 59-9-11 (Supp. I
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming
if wilful,
Dr.
misdemean-
$5; if wilful, $25.100
and/or 30 days.
If wilful, misdemean-
Dr, and up to $200
and/or 60 days.
R.I. GnN. LAws AxNs.
§ 28-42-38 (1956).
UTAE COD? ANsw.§35-4-11(g) (Supp. 1961).
WAsH. Rxv. Coor
§ 50.12.070 (1951).
Wvyo. Comp. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-34(m) (1957).
Qualified
Privilege
Na. REv. STAT.
§ 48-612 (1943).
* Letter From Harold L. Smith, Labor Commissioner, Kansas Employment Security Division, to the Notre Dame
Lawyer, Nov. 29, 1961, on file in the Notre Dame Law Library.
** Letter From A. M. Frazier, Commission Counsel, Employment Security Commission of New Mexico, to the
Notre Dame Lawyer, Nov. 27, 1951, on file in the Notre Dame Law Library.
** 8 CCH UNsmp. Irs. Rnp. Pa. j 1670.05 (1960).
stating that no action based upon information furnished by the employer to the
Unemployment Compensation Commission would lie, the statute dealing with
privileged communications grants only a qualified privilege.3 6
Other States -Analogous Situations
Arizona. The only statement made that an employer should not be subject to
damages sought in an action for libel or slander in this area was made by the
Attorney General in 1953.3Y The Criminal Code grants only a qualified privilege
for communications made by one interested party to another similarly interested
in the communications.38 Also, in Rose v. State, 9 a libel action which arose out
36 Rnv. CODE OF WASH. ch. 9.58, § .070 (1956).
37 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. No. 53-57-ESC (1953), 2 CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. Ariz. 1670.03
(1958).
38 AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-355 (1956).
39 54 Ariz. 396, 96 P.2d 285 (1939).
5 plus 1Ys% interest
on wages subject to
contribution.
$5 plus $5 for each
additonal 5-day peri-
od; if wilful, $50.
If wilful, $50-500 or
30 days.
If wilful, $10-100 and
/or 60 days.
If wilful, $50-250 and
(or 60 days.
50 and/or 30 days.
Indication that Employ-
er Will Be Protected
Fenning v. S.G. Hold-
ing Corp., 47 N.J.
Super. 110, 135 A.2d
346 (1957).
Letter From Employ-
ment Security Commis-
sion Counsel.**
Wagner v. Bell, Ct. of
Com. Pleas, Oct. 17,
1949.***
Mortensen v. Life In-
surance Corporation, 6
Utah 2d 408, 315 P.2d
283 (1957).
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of an affidavit charging a candidate for Governor with having hired people to
steal the election, the court refused to extend the doctrine of immunity and found
only a qualified privilege, saying:
A publication is conditionally or qualifiedly privileged where circumstances
exist or are reasonably believed by the defendant to exist which cast on
him a duty of making a communication to a certain other person to whom
he makes such other communication in the performance of such duty or
where the person is so situated that it becomes right in the interests of
society that he should tell third persons certain facts, which he in good faith
proceeds to do.40
Idaho. One lower court has discussed this problem and has held that as long as
the statements made are pertinent to the issue involved, the privilege afforded by
the occasion should be an absolute bar to any action for defamation.41 Investigation
reports, which must be submitted to the Commissioner of Insurance, concerning
insurance agents are "deemed privileged communications and .. . not . .admis-
sible in evidence in any court proceeding." 42
Louisiana. State v. Mills4 3 dealt with a criminal prosecution based on information
derived from required reports of the Louisiana Unemployment Compensation Act.
The court reasoned that since there was no explicit provision of the Act which
prohibited the use of the information in court, the recognition of a privilege would
be narrowly confined. Although this was not a libel action, it demonstrates that a
qualified privilege was the most that could be hoped for.
New Jersey. In Fenning v. S. G. Holding Corporation,44 the court construed a
landlord's letter, written to the rent control authority in reply to a tenant's answer,
to be libelous per se but non-actionable. It reasoned that the realm of absolute
privilege extends to quasi-judicial proceedings, i.e., those before boards and com-
missions.
Pennsylvania. There is a provision which states that in an action for libel a
plea of justification shall be accepted as a complete defense when it is proved that
the publication is proper for public information and has not been maliciously
made (qualified privilege) .45 Yet a lower court, terming proceedings before the
Unemployment Compensation Commission as quasi-judicial in character, has held
that a report, even though it might be malicious and untrue, will not subject an
employer to libel damages for classifying an employee as "mentally sick." 46
Utah. The Utah Supreme Court in Mortensen v. Life Insurance Corporation,47
although granting damages for libel, because a letter containing defamatory in-
formation was not really required by the Insurance Commission, adopted Professor
Prosser's approach to the effect that:
The judicial proceeding to which the immunity attaches has not been
defined very exactly. It includes any hearing before a tribunal which per-
forms judicial functions, ex parte or otherwise, and whether the hearing
is public or not. It extends to the proceedings of administrative officers,
such as boards and commissions, so far as they have powers of discretion
in applying the law to the facts which are regarded as judicial or quasi-judicial in character.48
40 Id. at 288.
41 Moon v. Capital Cleanears (Dist. Ct., 3rd Judicial Dist., Nov. 13, 1939), 3 OCH
UNEMP. INS. REP. Idaho 1 1670.02 (1958).
42 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1011(3) (1961).
43 229 La. 758, 86 So.2d 895 (1956).
44 47 N.J. Super. 110, 135 A.2d 346 (1957).
45 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1582 (1953).
46 Wagner v. Bell (Ct. of Com. Pleas, Oct. 17, 1949), 8 COCH UNEMP. INS. REP. Pa.
1670.05 (1960).
47 6 Utah 2d 408, 315 P.2d 283 (1957).
48 Id. at 284.
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Some of the remaining states have enacted statutes providing for immunity
in analogous situations. Connecticut holds required factory reports to be inad-
missible in evidence.49 Alaska, Delaware, Iowa, Rhode Island and Wisconsin have
clothed the reports made to the Workmen's Compensation Board with an absolute
privilege.5 0 Indiana and Wyoming have made provisions for the inadmissibility
in evidence of required motor vehicle reports.51
Conclusion
The fact remains that a large number of states have done nothing to protect
an employer from a libel suit in this area. In some states, notably New Jersey 2
and Utah,53 the courts have taken -the initiative and have extended the doctrine
of absolute privilege to proceedings before boards and commissions. In the New
York cases54 and in the United Mills5 case, the courts have utilized the confidential
nature of the reports to create an immunity from suit. Yet, when eight56 of the
twenty-nine states, which do not grant full protection to the employer in his dis-
closures to the commissioner, do not even classify the reports as confidential, an
employer is placed in a difficult situation; one, it is submitted, that was never
intended by the legislatures.
Originally, the tort of defamation was created as a safeguard for one's good
name and reputation in the community. The law, however, recognized at the
outset that there were certain instances where one should be permitted to publish
defamatory matter. Hence, the defense of privilege grew up in response to society's
need for information, e.g., the privilege accorded to statements made in judicial
proceedings and in the legislatures. In the area with which this article is concerned,
the public, through its Unemployment Compensation Boards, in order to make a
just determination of benefits, is entitled to know whether an employee has been
fired for cause. Since an employer has this information, he, too, should be immune
from suit in his disclosures. Since none of this material is published to those outside
the commission, what harm does the employee actually suffer? As a matter of
fact, there occurs only a "technical" libel for which no redress should be given.
An employer, by stating in a private communication to a governmental com-
mission or board that one of his former employees is "mentally sick" or "dishonest,"
should not be considered a calumniator, since the public has demanded that reports,
including reasons, be filed. The state legislatures should respond with the inclusion
of an absolute privilege in their statutes. However, in the absence of legislative
activity, the courts should not refuse to protect an employer who is faced with a
dilemma, i.e., whether to disclose his information and face a possible defamation
suit or whether to refuse to file his report and face a monetary penalty and/or
imprisonment. As was said in the Breuer case, in granting an absolute privilege,
"any other interpretation could well emasculate the Labor Law."5 7
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